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The juridical activity in recent Florida constitutional law is once
again startling-for the Supreme Court of Florida decided a multitude of
cases, in the past two years, involving our state constitution. There are,
perhaps, several factors which explain this total: (1) The Florida Constitu-
tion is quite long,2 very diversified in subject and poorly written; 4 (2) our
constitution is definitely antiquated;5 and (3) the Florida Supreme Court,
dedicated to reviewing practices which died in the United States Supreme
Court many years ago,6 attempts a grandiose judicial activity.
The language added to the constitution by amendment was not
significant during this period;7 the general recent growth in our constitu-
tional law must, then, be found in the many decisions-which decisions
were the result of unplanned controversies, factual conclusions of scattered
judges and lay juries, generally vague and ambiguous constitutional language
and the personalities of the justices of our state Supreme Court. The
organization of this paper is not particularly unique-the decisions easily
fitted into the plan utilized.
*Associate Professor, Faculty Advisor, Law School Publications, University of
Miami School of Law.
1, Volumes 66 through 80, Southern Reporter, second series. This article is
merely a survey. Former Survey statements, still apropos, are incorporated since the
Survey is a continuous affair.
2. The 6000 (approximately) words in the United States Constitution loom
small in comparison.
3. Subjects run from the clerk of the criminal court of record to, of all things,
the qualifications for sureties upon state bonds.
4. Read the beautiful language (comparatively) in the much earlier federal
constitution.
5. Obviously Florida before 1900 was extraordinarily different, in a social and
economic sense, from 1954 Florida. See Dauer and Howard, The Florida Constitution
of 1885-A Critique, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1955), which generally treats our constitutional
difficulties.
6. One cannot imagine today, for example, the Supreme Court deciding Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
7. A number of constitutional amendments will be offered to the electorate
Nov, 6, 1956. Included are the following: (1) a general revision of FL. CONST.
Art. V, which may go a long way to modernize the administration of justice in Florida.
The Judicial Council's recommended intermediate appellate courts undoubtedly will
eliminate many of the present Supreme Court's problems. Justice Barn's Survey
article on appellate procedure deals with the proposed Art. V. (2) Art. VIII, 1 11, the
long awaited panacea for Dade County-Miami governmental problems-a home rule
amendment for Dade County, (3) Art. III, § 2, an amendment dealing with the
legislative session times, and the convening thereof. (41 Art. VII, a controversial
apportionment-of-the-legislature amendment. (5) Art. XVI, an amendment to permit
legislative civil service systems. These proposed amendments were published by the
Secretary of State.
The constitution was amended as follows: (1) Art. III, §§ 2, 4 in 1954.
2I Art. Ill, § 28, in 1954. Additions were as follows: (1) Art. V, §§ 16 B, 39 A.
2Art. VilI, §§ 10lA, 22.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The approach of the writer to decisional constitutional law is realistic
and modem in the sense that: (1) judges are assumed as necessarily
creating law8 in the typical constitutional interpretation problem and (2)
government economic policy determination is assumed as the parliamentary
prerogative under separation of powers in representative democracy.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The body of the classic separation of powers tradition is still warm
in Florida. 10 This is an interesting example of certain static qualities in
Florida constitutional law. It is difficult to imagine a state supreme court,
in recent times, placing language" in a decision that "under our form of
government-the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial-no one of
them have the right to invade the sphere of operation of ...the other."
This assumes, of course, that only legislatures "make" the law, courts
"interpret" the law and only executives "execute" the law. With a mountain
of legal writings in the twentieth century maintaining that judges "make"
an appreciable portion of our law, that executives have to "interpret" to
enforce the law and "make" law by enforcement policies, and that ad-
ministrative agencies the world over handle, with equal ease, all the
traditional governmental powers, it is discouraging to find that the issue,
at least in the formal sense, has not quietly been laid to rest in Florida.
This section will be divided, as are the Florida cases, into the traditional
power fields.
(I) Judicial Power
Judicial Question.-The judicial power of the Florida courts only extends
to judicial questions; so what is a judicial question? This terminology is
defined by reference to the type of parties in suit, the interest the
parties demonstrate in the suit subject matter, the immediacy of the situa-
8. In the first place the constitutional language would generally permit a choice
if any real interpretation is necessary, i.e., substantive economic due process means a"reasonable" regulation of property. What is "reasonable" is judicial legislation of
necessity; see Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J.
550 (1948).
9. Compare CAHn, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW (1954)(the tone of
much of which calls for judicial review by policy determination) with Bickle, Judicial
Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative
Action, 38 IIARV. L. RFv. 6 (1924) (indicating that the real problem in economic policy
determination by courts is that the judicial technique for factual determination of the"reasonableness" of a law, is appallingly inadequate). Popular judicial economic philosophy
may not be cognizant of vast shifts in the socio-economic structure; for an example
of a recent interesting economic thesis see BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST
REVOLUTION (1954). See note 22, supra.
10. If any stark separation ever did exist it was in a setting which was not
modem. See, generally, Dodd, Administrative Agencies as Legislators and fudges, 25
A.B.A.J. 923 (1939).
Ii. White v. Johnson, 59 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1952). For a more recent
statement of the same kind, see Mr. Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1953) ("The
Judicial power is to interpret the law and not to make law"). See State v. Gray,
74 So.2d 114, 125 (Fla. 1954)(Mathews, J., dissenting to opinion and concurring
to order).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tion and the public interest therein, and perhaps more. 12  Dramatic, and
recent, definitive decisions here dealt with various attempts to clarify the
constitutional waters muddied by the aftermath of Governor McCarty's
untimely death. State v. Gray,13 in 1953, for example, was an original suit
by a citizen taxpayer for mandamus directing the Secretary of State to
show cause why he should not expunge from the records the names of
certain candidates for governor. The Court permitted suit on the theory
that the position of a candidate for governor under the election laws
carries the "apparent sanction" of the state. The fear of apparent legalization
of fund raising and that the legal questions were "novel" and "of im-
mense public interest," motivated the decision; a judicial question had
been presented. A similar case,' 4 testing by mandamus the candidacy of
Acting Governor Johns, reached a like result in 1954. In Bryant Y.
Gray' 5 the petitioner sought a declaration whether, if he sought election
in 1954 for the deceased Governor's unexpired term, he might seek
reelection in 1956. He did not definitely allege he would ever be a
candidate. The Secretary of State and two defendant announced candi-
dates denied any interest in the subject matter. The timing of the suit,
that "no present right is involved," that "his question is hypothetical
and is too remote," and that there must be a present "bona fide dispute"
were the court declared factors presenting a non-judicial question. In
these mandamus decisions, testing public office legal concerns, public in-
terest and the present sharpness of interest dispute were of import. The
latter received emphasis in a number of varied actions under differing phrase-
ology-such as actual "dispute" with parties of "antagonistic interests."' '
Prematureness in filing of suit and inadequacy of defense representation
have partially blocked attainment of the judicial question plateau. 17  The
Court required a "special interest in the subject" in Florida State Racing
Commission v. Broward County Kennel Club.'8 There the plaintiff winter
12. Such as the action-i.e., declaratory or mandamus.
13. 69 So.2d 187, 190-191 (Fla. 1953): see an unusual article in the field,
Ritter, The Florida Supreme Court and the Gubernatorial Election, 7 U. OF FLA. L. REV.
35 (1954).
14. State v. Gray, 74 So.2d 114 (la. 1954). Mr. justice Hobson, concurring
at page 119, worried over the use of the judicial power for other than "extraordinary"
cases, the lack of interest of the relator, and that the election was not involved, only
the primary (the timing of the action, then).
15. 70 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1954).
16. Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863-866 (Fla. 1954). Suit for declaration
of contract validity where contract parties, the city and county port authority, all desired
validation. See Sarasota-Fruitville Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, etc., 80 So.2d 335. 336
(Fla. 1955) and Riviere v. Orlando Parking Commission, 74 So.2d 694, 696 (Fla. 1954).
17. Brautigam v. MacVicar, 73 So.2d 863-866 (Fla. 1954); see note 16 supra.
Here the prematurity of suit probably would be corrected by an ultimate bond issuevalidation under the contract. The Attorney General, as representative of all citizens,
was disallowed as defendant since the statute required allegations of unconstitutionality
to permit that officer to defend. See Bessemer Properties v. Opa-locka, 74 So.2d 296
(Fla. 1954).
18. 77 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. 1955)(taxpayer failed, too). See Plan Mills, Inc. v.
Panama City, 78 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1955), for a somewhat different result on economic
emphasis.
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track sued to test the validity of a summer dog track's racing permit; the
Court weakened economic competition as an "interest" factor.
The Court again limited declaratory suits by judicial question require-
ments,19 placed administrative rulings outside the judicial question oasis
20
and refused to permit a "ministerial officer, charged with the duty of
administering a legislative enactment," the privilege of testing the "enact-
ment.t
21
Generally.-Study of judicial power in the United States is fascinat-
ing.22 There have been periods in our legal history when our judiciary
has expanded greatly its office, at times overshadowing the supposedly
"equal" executive and legislature. The courts have ravaged legislation
from behind a wall of judicial supremacy. There are some vestiges of
that judicial pedestal in our Florida legal scene. The area is multi-
faceted, running from who has a justiciable interest to political and
judicial questions, judicial restraint, judicial attitudes toward law-making,
and the general question of judicial power against a background of expand-
ing legislative power. The possible expansion or contraction, in any, is
inevitably felt in all.
The Supreme Court has not changed position recently in its restraint
as a conscious law making body23-refusing to utilize Florida Constitution,
Declaration of Rights, Section 4, as a power grant to judicially legislate. 2'
Related herewith is the relationship between the judicial and legislative
powers, in a sense not consciously articulated. Both cannot remain at a
legal high-tide mark. In several cases the Court appropriately weak-
ened its review powers over legislative action; Adams v. Miami Beach
Hotel Ass'n. 5 perhaps best exemplifies this constitutional rapport. In
Adams the Court validated a law requiring innkeeper advertisements
to detail certain information. The legislature was given a wide police
power in the "social legislation" field unless "some specific provision of
organic law is transgressed." A healthy presumption in favor of legislative
enactments was announced; "it is for the legislature and not the courts
to determine what is unnecessary, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.' "
And a "legislative finding that . . . a requirement is in the public interest
concludes the matter."
19. See North Shore Bank v. Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954).
20. Lambert v. State, 77 So.2d 869, 871 (Fla. 1955).
21. Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1954)(unless he "will be injured in
his person, property, or rights").
22. See, generally, POUND, Tim FORMATIVE ERA OP AMERICAN LAw (1938).
23. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 161 (1954).
24. See Slateoff v. Dezen, 76 So.2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954) (FiA. CoNsr. D. R., § 4,
provides that "all courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, ... and right
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.").
25. See 77 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1955).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
However, as this writer pointed out in the 1953 Survey,26 the consti-
tutionality of legislative police power extention generally depends on whether
the court determines the particular law is "reasonable". In this connection
a statement to the effect that courts, operating under such vague abstractions,
decide in a literal sea of relative subjectivity, was appropros. Presently an
examination of just one decision, Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd27 is illum-
inating. The suit attempted to enforce the state fair trade law. The Court
admitted that other state courts have authorized these laws but rejected
the Florida legislative attempt "on constitutional grounds," a conclusion
following rejection of the "underlying theory and the economic facts"
behind the law's passage. The legislative "finding of fact," generally thought
in the United States to be close to judicial unimpeachability, fell to the
Court's findings of fact by judicial notice. As Justice Hobson, concurring,
put it, legislative findings of fact will only stand where "fairly debatable"
and not "obviously contrary to proven and firmly established truths.
128
Definitely, in Florida, the legislative police power is restricted by the
judicial power, which in turn is dependent upon the prevailing economic
philosophy of the Supreme Court.21
The relationship between Florida courts and administrative boards
should be somewhat similar to that of the judicial-legislative power relation
since both are legislatively authorized and must depend, finally, upon the
inroads of judicial power into the legislative power. Strangely, this actually
works out-the emphasis on administrative correctness during court review,
based on the inexpertise of the court in the premises, varies just about as
unevenly as does the general reach of legislative police power. On occasion,
in zoning cases, the Court apparently strengthened the presumption of
correctness in favor of the zoning board; 0 other decisions indicated slight
regard for the same presumption.3' These cases, once again, were simply
factually inspired conclusions under a "reasonable" abstraction standard;
the ordinance was valid if reasonably related to health, safety and so on.
The Court's review of workmen's compensation orders generally respected
the commission's findings. 3 2 Probably one safe generalization is that the
Court strengthens review of administrative action when the administrative
procedures fail to meet due process standards.83  Another is that the
strength of the police power over the subject matter in the administrative
process partially determines, in reverse ratio, the strength of court review
26. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 M'nar L.Q. 162 (1954).
27. See 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
28. Id. at 682.
29. See, e.g., Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So.2d 765, 766-769 (Fla. 1954).
30. See Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1953).
31. See Miami Beach v. Steams 77 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1955).
32. E.g., Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1954); Four
Branches v. Fechsner, 73 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1954).
33. Compare Tamiami Trail Tours v. Carter, 80 So.2d 322, 324 (Fla. 1954) with
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gay, 74 So.2d 569, 572 (Fa. 1954).
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thereof.8 4 The Court admirably has prevented lower court mandamus
from exercising, directly, legislative authorized discretion35 of the agency
or officer.
The judicial power was defined in several decisions. In Barr v. Watts36
the "inherent" power of the judiciary to regulate bar admission was referred
to; in In re McRae's Estate:17 an inherent power in the Court to make
procedural rules for constitutional lower courts was not found. In one
case3 the Court reflected on its constitutional "power to issue writs of
certiorari." In yet another case3 ' ' the Court determined that still existent
with the integrated bar rule procedures, was "a summary jurisdiction to
deal with" the administration of attorney practice before the courts. The
use, wherever possible, of the comprehensive, and procedurally safer, bar
discipline procedures was advocated. In Lee v. Bauer4" the judicial power
to sunmmarily discipline an attorney, without hearing, for failure to comply
with a pre-trial conference order to attend in person, failed. This was not
"such a case" as warranted such imperfect procedures. Slatcoff v. Dezen4'
described the chancellor's powers to refer a case to a master, over party
objection. The decision interestingly portrays how much judicial power
may be so delegated and the circumstances permitting delegation.
42
Flow broad is the Florida judicial power? What is the impact on
the political powers of the executive and the legislature? Certainly it is that
the federal judicial power-with constitutionally expanded executive and
legislative functions, development of the so-called political question and
effective judicial self-restraint-is less powerful. A federal court would be
34. E.g., State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 75 So2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1954).
35. Singletary v. State, 69 So.2d 794, 798 (Fla. 1954). See also, Hunter v.
Solomon, 75 So.2d 803, 807 (Fla. 1954).
36. 70 So.2d 347, 349 (Fla. 1954); Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d 676, 678 (FIa.
1954).
37. 73 So.2d 818, 819 (Fla. 1954).
38. Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 69 So.2d 659, 662 (Fla. 1954).
39. State v. Giblin, 73 So.2d 851, 852 (Fla. 1954).
40. 72 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 1954).
41. See 74 So.2d 59 (1-a. 1954)(references for limited purposes, permissible;
broader reference may be prohibited by objection; presumption of master correctness,
strong; no complete delegation possible).
42. Also, in Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1955) (libel action and
grand jury) and Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 75 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1954)
(agency hearing words privileged as hearing "quasi-judicial in nature"), tile Court dealt
with judicial power and libel and slander causes.
Note:
'There were a number of miscellaneous decisions involving the courts and constitution.
(I) State v. Saperstein, 67 So.2d 911, 912 (tla. 1953)(writ of prohibition proper
to test jurisdiction of court acting under unconstitutional law); (2) Cone v. Cone,
68 So.Zd 886, 887 (Fla. 1953)(trial courts without authority to evade appellate court
mandate); (3) State v. Amidon, 68 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 1953)(forfeiture of money
not ancillary to criminal court jurisdiction); (4) Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gay, 68
So.2d 591, 593 (Fla. 1953): FLA. CoNsT. Art. V, § 11 states the circuit courts have"exclusive jurisdiction . . . in all cases involving the legality of any tax, assessment,
or toll .... " Issue was Supreme Court's jurisdiction to entertain original assault
on an assessment order. Held that appellate jurisdiction of the Court could not by-pass
§ 11. The validity of a tax or assessment was incidental question here; (5) Droit v.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
unlikely, in the year 1955 to crush the police power to the extent demon-
strated in Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd.43  The disturbing element on the
Florida judicial scene, to this writer, was the judicial innocence which
masterfully manipulated the various judicial techniques-"substantial
evidence," "fairly debatable," "clear and present danger," "reasonable rela-
tion"-to frustrate legislative-executive activity, while proclaiming the
"duty" of courts only to invalidate in cases'where the unconstitutionality is
"clear."44  A denial, then, that judges must "legislate" in even slightly
difficult constitutional issues, is unrealistic, for the abstraction inevitably
appealed to solves nothing without a human policy value judgment.45 And
to state that the impact of judicial power on civil and political rights may
be just as severe as the legislative power is not overstatement."
(II.) Legislative Power
The Court stated in 1952 that "under our State Constitution it is
not necessary that the constitution contain specific grants of power to the
Legislature .... For example, had there been absolutely nothing in the
Constitution . .. the Legislature would have been all-powerful." Then the
Court nullified this grant of power to the legislature by adopting Cooley's
famous doctrine of implied constitutional restrictions.47 The federal courts
develop implied powers and the Florida courts develop implied limitations
In the 1953 Brooks v. Pan American Loan Co. decision,48 the court stated
that "greater power is vested in the judiciary" than in the legislature, an
State, 71 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1954)(FLA. CONST. Art. V, § 21 states that statutory changes
relating to justice districts "shall be submitted to the people . . . by referendum at
the next ensuing general elction); (6) Ritter v. Bentley, 78 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1955)
(justice Drew, dissenting at page 577, argued that a provision of supersedeas bond
securing payment of attorney's fees was violative of some constitutional right.); (7) All
Florida Surety Co. v. Coker, 79 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1955)(construed FLA. CONST.
Art. V, § 5 to prohibit trial court from dismissing an appeal, after notice of a ppeal
filed in the Court); (8) State v. Carbonelli, 80 So.2d 913, 914 (Fla. 1955) (a
iudicial office in Florida may require a set term of office and no discretionary removal
power); (9) Young v. State, 69 So.2d 761, 762 (Fla. 1954); Williams v. State,
69 So.2d 766, 767 (Fla. 1954) (Supreme Court review when misdemeanors and felonies
charged in different counts of same information); see also, Pleger v. State, 68 So.2d
371 (Fla. 1953)(FA. CONST. Art. V, § 11 gives the Circuit Court appellate jurisdiction
of criminal court misdemeanor trials. Appeal on misdemeanor is proper where
solicitor dismissed as to felony).
43. 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
44. See, e.g., Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953); see also
Adood v. Jacksonville, 80 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 1955)(Court bowed to legislative intent
in interpretation of laws, Yet legislative debates, etc., are not published in Florida).
45. A recent statement is SCuWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 208-210
(1954).
46. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 80 So.2d 685 (1955)(possible freedom of speech,
press issue) and Shelly v. Brewer, 68 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1953)(Court characterizes a
dispute between two factions of political party as creating judicial question; not un-
attractive decision on facts, yet a definite entrance by judiciary into political processes).
The use of the temporary injunction in labor-management disputes is, of course, the
classic example. The amazing judicial blows dealt Miami Beach hotel labor organization,
in 1955, make the example more than classic; see note 160, infra.
47. Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d 173, 178 (Fla. 1952).
48. 65 So.2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1953).
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interesting constitutional thesis. In 1955, the Florida Court pleaded 4'
that the legislature was to be given a wide police power unless "some
specific provision of the organic law is transgressed" while standing on
the "fundamental principle that our State Constitution is a limitation
upon, rather than a grant of, power."' 0 The decisional language rationalizing
the various judicial approaches to curb legislative power means little; exam-
ination of the judicially validated laws alone has meaning.
Delegation of legislative power-Delegation validity is generally in-
cluded with separation of powers problems since the concept of unconstitu-
tionality here depends on a true separation. Delegation of legislative power
as an argument is probably pass6 in the federal system 5' and is not spectacu-
larly strong in Florida. Subject matters judicially authorized a large
police power regulation were within the charmed circle of broad legislative
power delegation. For example, the determinations by boards of road
and bridge locations, under the safety police power, had easy riding. The
Court stated that when "the legislature enacts a law complete in itself
to accomplish a general purpose it may authorize . . . designated officials
to promulgate rules ... to effectuate the purpose .... ,,52 Florida Livestock
Board v. Gladden55 carried a valid delegation, for Florida, quite far. The
Court allowed the Board to postpone the effective date of a law regulating
diseased animals without direct legislative authority.
Where a city ordinance regulating building permit issuance so that
"no operation shall be carried on which is injurious ...by reason of the
objectionable emissions of cinders, dust, dirt, fumes ...vapor, vibration,
or similar substances or conditions" was applied to deny use of property
to a gasoline filling station, the Court called for an "intelligible principle"
so that the law be fixed "with such certainty that they not be left to the
whim or caprice of the administrative agency." 5' 4 The decision apparently
would restrict the "intelligible principle" to common law nuisance definitions;
this might, of course, hold administrative law to what was objectionable
in the time of Elizabeth 1.
19. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Ass'n, 77 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1955).
50. Board of Pub. Ed. v. Wright, 76 So.2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1955).
51. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)(possibly only a war power
case) gave it a death blow; all that case required was that the Congress lay out an
area for the agency to work in. The congressional standard can presently be sufficiently
indefinite to permit the agency to experiment on the particular socially troubled
subject matter.
52. State v. Florida Turnpike Authority, 80 So.2d 337, 346 (Fla. 1955); Pirman
v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n, 78 So.2d 718 719 (Fla. 1955) (same).
53. 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954) (attractive case on acts since the law was incomplete,
in operative sense, until board's rules clarified); State v. Dee, 77 So.2d 768, 769
(Fla. 1955) (similar in approach).
54. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1954)(due
process uncertainty a factor, too). Miami v. Board of Pub. Inst., 72 So.2d 901, 903
(Fla. 1954), is similar in approach. Perhaps explainable because of the detailed
constitutional structure embracing the public school property field.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The permissably large grant of legislative power to municipalities,
known well at common law,55 is still uncertain as to scope in Florida. 6
With the definite exception of weak police power regulative subject
matters the Florida Court's attitude toward the administrative board with
delegated powers was quite modern; "it may be that too much authority
is given to a particular administrative board, but that is for the Legislature
to determine . . . 7
(III) Executive Power
Essentially, the de facto judicial power reach defines, by inroad or
exit, the de facto executive power operative field.58
Gove nor-The constitutional position of the state chief executive recently
received relatively heavy decisional play. State v. Gray,59 in 1953, defined
Florida Constitution Article IV, Section 19, reading, "In case of the
impeachment of the Governor, his removal from office, death . . . the
powers and duties . . . shall devolve upon the President of the Senate for
the residue of the term . . . . But should there be a general election for
members of the Legislature during such vacancy, an election for Governor
. .. shall be had . . . ." The Court read this election phraseology literally,
indciating also that only the "power and duties," not the office of Governor,
devolve upon the Senate President.
The 1954 State v. Gray6" determined the effect of Florida Constitution,
Article III, Section 5, reading "no Senator . . . shall during the time for
which he was elected, be appointed, or elected to any civil office under
the Constitution . . . . that has been created, or the emoluments, whereof
shall have been increased during such time." Former Senate President,
then Acting Governor, Johns, was apparently restricted to completing the
deceased Governor's term since the 1953 Legislature had appropriated a
$3000 governor's salary increase. The Court determined to regard Section 5
through the eyes of the constitutional framers, took judicial notice of the
post-Civil War office purchase outrages and concluded that since Acting
55. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 165 (1954).
56. Compare Hialeah v. Hill, 79 So.Zd 658 (Fla. 1955) and State v. North
Miami, 73 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1954).
57. Webb v. Hill, 75 So.Zd 596, 605 (1954). Note: The Court dealt slightly
with legislative power, more or less out of a police power context. For example, in
Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 349 (Fla. 1954) a concurrent power, with the judiciary,
over bar admission was suggested and in In re McRae's estate, 73 So.2d 818, 819 (Fla.
1954) by implication the Court indicated legislative power to deal with rules of
proceaure for lower constitutional courts.
58. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S, 579 (1952).
59. 69 So.2d 187, 191-194 (Fla. 1953); see also Advisory Opinion to Acting
Governor Johns, 67 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1953)('you are authorized to designate yourself
as Acting Governor." Also, FLA. CONST. Art. IV, § 24 permitted Acting Governor
to adopt certain signatures of deceased Governor).
60. 74 So.2d 114, 117-119 (Fla. 1954).
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Governor Johns would have to submit his candidacy to the people, his
case was outside of the "spirit" of Section 5.61
Boards and Agencies-A number of administrative law concepts were de-
liberated during the Survey period. The Supreme Court held that adminis-
trative regulations had the force of statute law;62 board members could
resist cross-examination concerning the basis of their decision; 63 mandamus
could not be used to direct an agency to exercise discretion in a certain
inanner;"'4 defamatory words published in a hearing not "merely administra-
tive" but "quasi-judicial in nature" were privileged; " and that a hearing
officer's position was "somewhat analogous to that of a chancellor" while
the full commission "occupies a position .. .similar to that of an appellate
court."16 Unfortunately, in these decisions the Court still uses timeworn
antiques such as "purely administrative" powers and "quasi-judicial body;"
the decisions have an old world air.67
The Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, being constitu-
tionally inspired, was stated68 to deal with "judical power" but strangely
could not "delegate" that power; only officers elected, or governor appointed,
could "exercise" what is a restricted constitutional judicial power. Certainly
in a modern state it is an anachronism to refer to a constitutional grant
of power to permit what now are traditional agency functions. The power
of the State Board of Pardons was held not to include ordering paroles. 96
The Court interpreted miscellaneous constitutional language, related
to the executive and administrative,7 and again disallowed a "ministerial
61. That no one could have forseen the Governor's untimely death was a factor,
too. Court distinguished Fraser v. Gay, 28 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1947), on theory that there
the increase was not temporary and the submission of Johns' case to people, here.
Justice Drew, concurring at p. 123, wanted to recede from the Fraser decision and
permit the "Gomez Clause" (a law legislatively attempting to save legislators from
Section 5 operation by lifting, as to their offices such salary increases.) to save Johns.
Justice Mathews, dissenting to opinion and concurring to order, at p. 125, thought that
state budget board's attempt to eliminate the legislative salary increase was invalid since
under FLA. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 29 the governor's salary can only be changed by the
legislature. That "Gomez Clause" is invalid under separation of powers principle and
Art. II § 5. He, and Justice Terrell, dissenting, agreed the Fraser case controlled here.
Justice Mathews also interpreted Art. IV, § 29 as restricting the legislative method to
increase governor's salary to a technique, here not used.
62. See Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden, 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
63. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gay, 74 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1954).
64. Hunter v. Solomon, 75 So.2d 803, 807 (Fla. 1954). See Singletary v.
State, 69 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954).
65. Robertson v. Industrial Comm'n, 75 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 1954).
66. Four Branches v. Oechsner, 73 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1954) (wisely strengthening
the hearing officer, similar to APA attempt).
67. See Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., 69 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954) (review of
Industrial Commission order was descnbed).
68. Tamiami Trail Tours v. Carter, 80 So.2d 322 324-327 (Fla. 1954).
69. Beal v. Mayo, 70 So.2d 367, 368 (Fla. 1954S.
70. The importance of these decisions could he overemphasized. (1) Blackburn
v. Broreim, 70 So.2d 293 (1954). FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 27 states that "the Legislature
shall provide for the election by the people or appointment by the governor of all state
and county officers not otherwise provided for by the Constitution, and fix by law
their duties and compensation." Issue was validity of civil service regulation of deputy
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officer, charged with the duty of administering a legislative enactment"
from raising the question of its constitutionality, unless personally
"injured."71
(IV) Conclusion
The separation of powers doctrine in Florida depends for its strength
upon the quantitative restraint the Florida Supreme Court exercises in
maintaining its judicial power. The power to review legislative and
administrative action can become a frankenstein of judicial power.72 Sub-
stantive due process, procedural due process and separation of powers are
but tools, in a final sense, with which courts employ the judicial
power to, at times, drastically limit action by the perhaps more representa-
tive governmental departments.
73
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRocEss-THE POLICE PowEs 4
The denial to government of the power to take or regulate life or
property is a concern of substantive due process-the disagreement is not
over the procedure to take but over the validity of the very taking 571 The
Supreme Court of Florida apparently does not distinguish between sub-
stantive due process and the state police power. 6 Probably the court views
the substantive due process as directly related to the constitutionally valid
sheriffs. Court held deputy sheriffs "officers" provided for in Constitution; that election
or governor appointment not necessary to create a § 27 "office", which means "a
delegation of a portion of the sovereign power;" that deputy sheriffs are a "class of
officers" under Art. I, § 20 prohibition of special or local legislation regulating the
"jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers except ultnicipal." (2) 'Wagner v. Gray,
74 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1954). FLA. CONST. Art. XVI, § 8: "a plurality of votes given
at an election of officers . . ." was held to refer only to the final election, not
primaries. (3) Graham v. Board of Pub. Inst. 76 So.2d 874-876 (Fla. 1955). Board
member's statutory compensation eliminated by law leaving only expense money.
Plaintiff could only be removed for cause under FLA. Co Ns'r. Art. IV, § 15. Legislature,
under F.A. CONST. Art. 11, § 27, regulates officers not otherwise provided for in
constitution. Court stated that only the drastic lowering of a "constitutional" officer's
salary would be invalid. Legislature given plenary power over non-constitutional officers.
4) State v. Florida Turnpike Auth., 80 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1955). Interpretation of
t. ll,§ 27 supra, "appointment" by governor not to mean "designated." Also FLA.
CONST. Art. XVI, § 15, prohibiting anyone from holding "more than one office"
not violated by Turnpike Authority membership by State Road Department official-on
theory that both positions functionally related and a new office not created but only
allied duties for Road Department official.
71. Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 350 (Fla. 1954).
72. See note 22 supra.
73. Examine the procedural and substantive due process sections with this thought
in mind. A plea for state constitutional law which emphasizes the theoretically large
grant of power to the legislature, in the state constitution, instead of that emphasizing
the theoretically small restrictions thereon can be found, e.g., in Sarye, The Extent of
State Legislative Power, 12 GA. B. 1. 147 (1949). Judicial "interference" in the
government process probably is not the best solution to legislative excesses, Paulsen,
The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MrNrN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
74. For recent survey of American due process of law, see WOOD, DUE PRocEss
OF LAw, 1932-949 (1951); Brockelbank, Role of Due Process in American Law, 39
CORN. L.Q. 561 (1954).
75. The writer realizes that these concepts are not clearly distinguishable in fact,
but believes this terminology is useful because of overwhelming pragmatic usage.
76. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1952).
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breadth of the police power.77  At least in theory" the state constitution
acts as a limitation on the generally broad state police power, and the
limitation is to be strictly construed.
The federal government, on the other hand, is theoretically one of
constitutionally delegated powers, which powers are to be strictly construed.
In fact,79 the past course of state and federal constitutional law has been very
different. The federal powers have been immensely broadened by a Su-
preme Court which, until only recently, cooperated with state supreme
courts in drastically limiting the state police power.10 This severe constitu-
tional corset placed on state governmental power may well explain the
heavy pressure on the federal government to assume activities once thought
of as local in nature.8
1
It is convenient to break down the general state police power into the
various subject matters which seem in Florida to have the police power
thrown around them.82
(I.) Regulation of Businesses Affected with a Public Interest
The Florida Supreme Court, unfortunately, is wedded to terminology
which has generally lost its effectiveness elsewhere. The traditional view
was that the police power was only broad enough to regulate a "business
affected with a public interest." The modem industrial state and its
attendant problems have cracked this concept-a valiant protector of
private contract and private property.83  The present Florida Supreme
Court is dedicated, theoretically, to a weakened power to review (which
mirrors judicial power, generally) the state police power by establishment
of an equally strengthened presumption of correctness of legislative exercise
77. At least this writer hopes so. A modem outlook would view the police
power as limited by only a few basic constitutional limitations-rather than private
property as an unlimited concern except for a few valid police power regulations. Life
in Florida is no longer agrarian simplicity.
78. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE
L.J. 137 (1919).
79. Ibid.
80. See, generally, Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
81. Examples are legion: such as social security, labor relations and education.
Witness the demolishment of the old "local" "intrastate" area sacred from the Federal
interstate commerce powers, e.g., United States v. Sonth Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,
322 U.S. 533 (1944). The Florida police power and the federal power were in slight
recent conflict; this is dealt with here as easily as any other place. In Perez v. Trifiletti,
74 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1954), the issue was whether the Taft-Hartley Act pre-empted the
field of violence in labor disputes, to exclude the state police power; of course, the court
held not. In Olan Milk, Inc. v. Panama City, 78 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1955), the Court
invalidated a municipal tax with a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce (higher
tax on foreign corporation agents). Tatum v. Hallandale, 71 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1954)
was suit by aircraft operator to enjoin city ordinance licensing flights to advertise.
Operator complied with all state and federal rules. Court did not attempt to determine
precisely the federal pre-emption, but, under test of "local" subject matter and lack of
federal interest therein, validated.
82. The Florida Supreme Court seems to so distinguish. Other states have
trouble here, also; McKinnon, Due Process of Law and Economic Legislation-North
Carolina Style, I DuKE B.J. 51 (1951).
83. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930).
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of the police power.8 4 If this presumption of correctness means anything,
then the terminology "public interest" carries with it all businesses, and
a heavy burden has to be carried by him who would show otherwise.
The Court stated in 1955,85 that the "legislature may prescribe the
qualifications of persons authorized to engage in any trade or occupation
affected with a public interest" as long as such regulations are not "un-
reasonable." This approach to police power validity, under a "public
interest" limitation paralyzes the general presumption of police power
validity. This terminology perhaps strengthens the legislative hand only
when the subject matter is one classicly "public"8' 6 in nature or one tra-
ditionally regulated at common law.87  When such conditions were met
the Supreme Court 8 easily located the "business" properly "affected with
a public interest" and wrote appealingly of a wide police power for "social
legislation;" that "it is for the legislature and not the courts" to determine
what is "unnecessary, unreasonable . . . and capricious."
(II) ZoningsO
The modern approach 0 to zoning and planning demonstrates a
judicial awareness that cities necessitate planned growth. The whole subject
is treated by the courts as expert in nature. Courts are not such experts.
This requires a strong zoning board presumption of correctness. The
Florida Supreme Court decisions were not consistent. Miami Beach v.
8301 Collins Avenue" indicated a lack of judicial awareness of these
fundamentals. Therein the Court simply determined the unreasonableness
of the city zoning plan and invalidated; the presumption seemed at that
point to desert the zoning forces. Miami Beach v. SilverM2 demonstrated
the more functional judicial attitude. The burden was placed on the com-
plaining citizen to show the unreasonableness of excluding professional offices
in designated districts. The general police power to zone and plan was
referred to by the Court. The zoning ordinance survived under the state-
ment that the "burden of one who attacks such an ordinance has been
called an extraordinary one." Further, a "person ... must allege and
thereafter prove such facts as to make it appear the statute is invalid."
84. E.g., Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Ass'n, 77 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1955);
Smith v. Ervin, 64 So.2d 166, 169 (Fla. 1953).
85. Lambert v. State, 77 So.2d 869, 871 (Fla. 1955).
86. See Belcher v. Florida Power & Light Co., 74 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1954) (legislature
could "clothe public service corporation" with condemnation power).
87. See Adam v. Miami Beach Hotel Ass'n, 77 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1955) (at common
law-inns; here-hotels, motels and so on).
88. Id. at p. 467-468.
89. One could argue over inclusion of zoning powers.
90. E.g., Comment, Municipal Zoning Law in Connecticut, 35 CoN. B.I. 162
(1951). See Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW AND CONT.
PROB. 199 (1955).
91. 77 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1954)(equal protection case, also); see also, Miami
Beach v. Stearns, 77 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1955).
92. 67 So.2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1953); But cf., Charnofree Corp. v. Miami Beach,
76 So.2d 665, 670 (Fla. 1954) ("such restrictions must find their basis in the safety,
health, morals." Possible equal protection case.)
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A decision correctly demonstrating the zoning constitutional fact
procedure was Miami Beach v. Laekman.93 The question was the reason-
ableness of an ordinance limiting quite valuable property to single family
residences. The announced appellate standard was whether the owner's
proof left the evidentiary picture "not fairly debatable." An impressive
array of witnesses supporting both parties appeared before the trial court
(realtors, appraisers, city planners, economists, and so on.) The city's
evidence indicated a traffic safety basis for the ordinance. That basis
was determined reasonable by the Supreme Court. That the proof was
sharply contradictory saved the city under the "not fairly debatable" test.
The occasional conflict between private property and a zoning agency
over the possible court-enforced use of the eminent domain procedure was
recently resolved in the 1954 Miami v. Romer case.9 4 An owner of property
fronting on a street claimed that a city ordinance, unrelated to the police
power, and which required no building closer than 25 feet to the center
of the street, was invalid, He argued that the city should have condemned
his property and compensated him. The Court ordered the case to the
lower court to determine the police power reasonableness of the set-back.
Zoning power follows the general police power, of which it can be
considered a part, in that if the zoning ordinance is not proven "unreason-
able", it is validated. 5 This judicial attitude toward the zoning power in
Florida obviously should accommodate all but the very unreasonable
property regulations and restrictions. Such was not the case in the Survey
years. In Phillips Petroleum Company v. Anderson"d the Florida Court
apparently obviated any restrictive zoning possibility in the "dust, dirt,
fumes, gas, odor, noise . . . vibration, or similar substances or conditions"
sense, which possibility was unrelated to common law nuisance definitions.
Lippon v. Miami Beach97 actually stated that the zoning power could not
be used to "resist the natural operation of economic laws," an unusually
frank judicial imposition of a particular economic philosophy.98 Finally,
in Miami v. Hollis the Court perhaps operated upon the "fairly debat-
93. 71 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1953) appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906, 1954. (second
basis was possible economic injury by more hotels to existing hotels). Miami v. Ross,
76 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1954), initially permitted the city time to develop an area-wide
zoning plan, under city admitted facts, similar to Lachman's argument, since plaintiff
showed no special hardship. On rehearing, lower court's order to city to rezone was
upheld,
94. 73 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954). Ocean Villa Apartments v. Fort Lauderdale,
70 So.2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1954), stated that if the set-back had effect of completely
depriving owner of the only reasonable beneficial use of the property, it was invalid.
95. Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So.2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1953).
96. 74 So.2d 544, 548 IFla. 1954).
97. 68 So.2d 827, 829 (Fla. 1953). Beck v. Littlefield, 68 So.2d 889, 890
(Fla. 1953), was more satisfactory on facts. There the Court indicated that indefinite
prohibition to build on property would be invalid. In the Lippow case, supra, restriction
on property to lessen economic challenge to existing economic structure was frowned
upon. Why, in a county of over 500,000 persons, may not the various municipalities
do more than asthetic planning?
98. Spencer, anyone?
99. 77 So.2d 834, 836 (Fla. 1955).
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able" test to its death. There the court appointed master found the
evidence state was beyond "debate"; the Supreme Court found the evidence
state "sufficient to justify" the master and chancellor; and the "burden"
was then upon the appellant to show reversible error. Interesting possi-
bilities?
(II1) Spending and Disposing00
Harwell v. Sheflield'°' referred to the state spending power in the
weak phraseology that (at least when public education was concerned)
the state could "place any reasonable condition" upon the "availability" of
state funds. Recent decisions went far in crippling the state spending and
disposing powers. Clearwater v. Caldwell102 was illustrative in approach.
The city attempted to lease city property for 50 years to a private, profit
seeking, citizen. The court's response was swift and deadly: "It may be
argued that it is desirable for the City . . . to enter into the real estate
business and lease its property for hotels, drug stores .. . .Such a change
in policy may well threaten the entire free enterprise system . . . . Why
not extend it to . . . collective farms under the system of Communism?"
The Court definitely restricted the police power exercise to a "public
purpose," which apparently means a property disposal of small consequence
or one closely related to basic municipal function.103
In the 1954 Survey this writer suggested that the decisions showed
expenditures were valid for "play" but not to enable local government to
build for the future. Sunny Isles Fishing Pier v. Dade County,10 4 a validation
of a 30-year property lease leading to private construction and operation
of a resort fishing pier, makes re-writing the suggestion possible in 1956.
The "public purpose" was in the lease advantages to the resort, and the
small activity involved. As in 1954 it was stated that the local government
itself could have run the pier. 0 5 Here again the Court emphasized the
"private enterprise" philosophy requirement, yet necessarily 0 6 left the
local government a way out, which was the antithesis thereof.
The Court required state funds to be spent for a state purpose,
fortunately liberally defining state purpose. 07  School fund expenditure,
a constitutional mystery,106 received some recent court attention.
100. The Court at times distinguishes these powers.
101. 77 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 1955).
102. 75 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1954) (probably most of constitutional talk was dictum).
103. The sale of cigars, candy and so on in a court house by lease arrangement
to a blind man, perhaps.
104. 79 So.2d 667 (F1a. 1955).
105. Without charge the Court stated; this would be an unlikely requirement.
106. In view of the common law on the subiect?
107. State v. Tampa, 72 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1954) (F.A. CoNsr. Art. Ill, § 20;
public health is not necessarily local in nature).
108. Just read the Florida constitutional structure guarding school funds, property,
financing and so onl In Board of Pub. Inst. v. Wright, 76 So.2d 863 (Ma. 1955)
recovery on school bonds included interest after maturity and on interest coupons.
Justice Mathews, dissenting, at page 778, stated Art. XII § 8 set up a "sacred fund"
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(IV) Borrowing and PledgingIO
This general constitutional situation is dealt with in another part of
the article. Quickly, the Florida Court required that the government
borrow money in view of a pre-determined expenditure for a "public pur-
pose." This abstraction standard operated to discipline government bor-
rowing, bringing it within the Court's economic philosophic line. State
v. Miami"0 demonstrated this. There the court determined, by reaching
into the scope of traditional common law endeavors, that an international
trade mart, analogous to the common law supported public market, was a
proper "public purpose."
The 1952 State Y. North Miami"' decision on "public purpose" was
neatly sidestepped by the Court in 1954.112 The problem was validation of
city revenue certificates to finance warehouse construction for eventual lease
to the Orange Bowl Committee to store floats and so on. The North Miami
case involved leasing a manufacturing plant to private industry. The
distinguishing factors were that here there was a non-profit organization, a
direct relation between the city's "major industry, tourism" and the project,
and all the Committee would receive from the affair was "personal satis-
factions and spiritual values" of public service. Perhaps the Court failed
to take cognizance of North Miami's size; North Miami citizenry would
probably receive a great deal more from a long range manufacturing project
than Miami from neat parade floats, yearly displayed.
Also decided were cases dealing with long term local borrowing
arrangements" 3 and investment of state license tax monies in local bond
issues.114
The definite possibility" 5 of an illegal "public purpose" in bonds to
build a segregated school system, after Brown v. Board of Education,"6 did
not deter the bond legalization.
not permitting this recovery. Miami v. Board of Pub. Inst., 72 So.2d 901, 904 (Fla.
1954) decided Board could not discharge from school funds assessment lien for abutting
public improvements. In discussion, the constitutional school fund practices under
Art. XII, §§ 9, 10, 17 were covered. Madison v. Board of Pub. Inst. 72 So.2d 913
(Fla. 1954), limited school property use to a school purpose, permitting Board to
close a street over school property under Art. XII, § 13.
109. See generally, Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing,
6 FLA. L. REV. 287, 311-313 (1953).
110. 76 So.2d 294, 297 (Fla. 1954).
111. 59 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1952). lHere government borrowing and spending was
invalidated-for purchase of land and construction of a plant, to rent to private
industry.
112. State v. Miami, 72 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1954).
113. State v. County of Flagler, 77 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 1955). Here the
county issued bonds to improve a state road in county under agreement with State
Road Department. Under agreement Department leased road for 30 year life of bonds
and pledged rent of certain uncommitted gasoline tax funds. field: that issuance
not so disproportionate to county taxable property assessed valuation to invalidate-
since primary funds for servicing bonds estimated as adequate.
114. State v. State Board of Ed., 67 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1953) (Court interpreted
FLA. CONST. Art. XII, § 18).
115. Board of Pub. Inst. v. State, 75 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1954) (See Justice Mathews'
dissent).
116. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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(V) TaxationlT
The Florida tax power strength tolerated by the judiciary did not
mirror a clear picture. The Court in 1954 11S discussed the "great power of
taxation" and in the same year permitted a procedurally weak notice to
survive in a tax suit."" In State v. Florida State Racing Commission'
20
the Court described a tax as an involuntary payment in permitting certain
race track profits to be spent for charity and education; whether the
definition was intcndcd in a constitutional sense is impossible to state.
In Volusia County Kennel Club v. Haggard'12 the power to tax dog
race tracks according to the amount of daily gross receipts was broadly
denied. The Court distinguished the tax and spending powers so that
a "good purpose" for expenditure failed to support the tax power. On
the theory the legislature had legitimized track gambling, the Court refused
the traditional great police power over gambling, based on regulation of
morals, The tax power had to do more than the mundane business of
gaining revenue; it had to be utilized to "further regulation of the business"
taxed. This distinguished the tax and general police powers by necessitation
of sonic police power regulation allied with revenue raising. Apparently
a tax must be differentiated in application on some basis other than
income size. On a rehearing' 22 the Court may have held the tax a pro-
hibited income tax, permitted a possible out for legislative tax writers by
a privilege tax based on privilege worth, and refused use of the tax device
to aid the general police power necessities.
In State v. County of Flagler'23 the Court stated that "an involvement
of the county's taxing power for a 30-year period might well be held'"
unreasonable if that tax were likely to become primarily obligated for bond
servicing. Levying an ad valorem tax to service a bridge used in, but
not owned by, a road district was authorized.' In Armstrong v. State'25
117. Here, too, one might argue against inclusion under the police power. The
Federal tax power is practically unlimited, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937).
118. Shavers v. Duval, 73 So.2d 684, 692 (Fla. 1954) (Court suggested this
power could regulate contracts to the "'iipairmient" state).
119. Mullin v. Polk, 76 So.2d 282, 284 (Fla. 1954) (suit to quiet title for
delinquent taxes).
120. 70 So.2d 375, 379.380 (Fla. 1953) ('lhis more or less took care of a tax
non-public purpose argument. Court apparently validated under FLA. CONST. Art.
IX, § 2).
121. 73 So.2d 884, 886-887 (Fla. 1954) (Court held tax not an income tax, under
Art. IX, § 11; federal constitutional equal protection was interpreted, with equal
protection in Florida, as requiring conclusion). See Laws of Fla. c. 29694'(1955) and
Laws of Fla. c. 29751 (1955).
122. Id. at 895-890.
123. 77 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 1955) (primary obligation to pay from funds
accruing to Road Department under FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 16. lhe Court did
look askance at the disproportionate bonded indebtedness to the county's assessed
valuation of taxable property. IHowever, here the primary funds obligated appeared
ample).
124. State v. Florida State Improvement Commii'i, 75 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1954).
125. 69 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 1954) (Art. VIII, § 6; duties of tax assessor were
discussed; difficult to determine decision basis-statutory or constitutional).
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it was held that a tax equalization board could not reduce, in blanket
fashion, all assessments of property in the county when no particularized
assessment complaint had been heard. The decision also stated that under
Florida Constitution, Article IX, Section 1 (State tax principles) and
Florida Constitution, Article IX, Section 5 (county tax principles),120
state taxation must be uniform throughout the state, and county taxation
throughout the county.
Florida Constitution Article XVI, Section 16,127 and Article XII,
Section 17128 were also interpreted.
(VI) Eminent Domain 128
The great governmental power of eminent domain was broadly char-
acterized in Shavers v. Duval. 30 In the Shavers case the immediate issue
was whether the mortgagee was entitled to the entire principal mortgage
amount with interest to date and the future interest amount agreed paid
to the mortgage maturity date. The problem then was that of the impact
of eminent domain on the non-impairment of contract obligation principle.
The Court treated eminent domain not as a power "granted to the State"
but one "reserved as an attribute of sovereignty."' 13' Procedural due process
and just compensation were stated as the only eminent domain limits,132
and private contracts should be made in view of this constitutional situation;
in effect, this subjected non-impairment of contract obligations to eminent
domain when utilized for a "public use" or "public purpose" and, the court
stated, the general police power when utilized "reasonably." This sharply
distinguished the police and eminent domain powers."13
126. Id. at p. 321: within the taxing area the method of assessment must be
equal and uniform; if so, no equalization of assessments justified. Smithers v. North
St. Lucie River Drainage Dist., 73 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1954) authorized under Art. IX,
§ 1, a differentiation of lands to equalize the tax impact. This section was stated
not to apply to special assessments, only ad valorem taxes. Perhaps the federal constitu-
tion was also involved in case.
127. Gautier v. Biscayne Shores Imp. Corp., 68 So.2d 386, 388 (Fla. 1953),
where the owner, a corporation for profit, leased property for educational usage by
military academy under nominal rental. lield: test was "the character of purpose for
which the property . . .used" to determine tax exemption.
128. Board of Pub. Inst. v. Wright, 76 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla. 1955), interpreting
Art. XII, § 17 stating the tax "shall not be applied to any purpose other than
the payment of the principal and interest." Issue: whether interest upon coupons
after maturity possible? Held: Authorized to pay.
129. The great power might well be considered separately from the general
police power. The convenience in not so doing rests upon the fact that substantive
and procedural due process apparently reach into both, and the eminent domain action
is generally in aid of some facet of the general welfare. A good general article on eminent
domain is Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L.
REv. 596 (1954).
130. 73 So.2d 684, 689-92 (Fla. 1954) (Court failed to distinguish between federal
and state law.)
131. The old federal foreign relations power argument in essence.
132. FLA. CONST. D. R., § 12 and Art. XVI, § 29.
133. See also, Watts v. Duval County, 75 SoZd 316 (Fla. 1954). The mortgage
contract prohibited anticipatory mortgage payments; the lower court paid mortgagee
the principal, and interest limited to suit commencement. Arguments against such
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The court in an emotive statement in Clearwater v. Caldwell"4 appar-
ently restricted the police powers relating to expenditures or property
disposals to a "purpose" designed not to "threaten" the "free enterprise
system" (the case involved simply a long term municipal property lease
to private enterprise). State v. North Miami 35 and Adam v. Housing
Authority'-" were declared apropos to the Cleanvater rationale. These
were fairly recent cases, limiting sharply the state police power reach.
In State v North Miami, the powers to spend and of eminent domain
were, in effect, equated, but neither was held sufficient to authorize expen-
ditures to purchase land, construct an aluminum plant thereon and there-
after to rent the project to a private industry. Spending for a "public
utility" or a "public service" would be proper. hlie old police power
regulation terminology raised its ugly head again.
Adams v. Housing Authority was the most important recent decision
in constitutional eminent domain. There the legislature authorized the
city, by purchase and eminent domain, to acquire a "blighted area," plan
a development for the area, re-zone it under that plan and sell or lease
the project to private enterprise for general commercial usage. The decision
was quite confused. The Court distinguished between the police and
eminent domain powers-the former to be exercised without compensation
(the power to regulate property "to promote the health, morals and safety"-
what happened to the general welfare?), the latter requiring compensation.
Assuming this to be true, why are not the powers usable in aid of each
other? The police power alone should be used, according to the court,
to abate such an area's filthy slums. The eminent domain power was
restricted to a "public use" the court found not present. Yet the court
also limited the spending power of government equally in the case. So
government, faced with a cancerous area in its midst, could only abate
that ailment by condemnation as a nuisance (as unhealthy) or condemna-
tion under eminent domain, which leaving the land to be developed again,
perhaps, by the same owners who originally permitted it to disintegrate.
The crux seems to be the redevelopment by private enterprise which, under
the vague terminology "public use", led the court to invalidate as a dis-
turbance to "private enterprise."
condemnation payment grounded on both constitutions; due process, equal protection
and contract obligation impairment. Court failed to distinguish. Justice Thomas.
dissenting at p. 319, suggested a jury should determine present discount valne of
mortgage. Justice Mathews, writing opinion, suggested Shavers case, supra, controlled;
he permitted lower court two possibilities for mortgagee; receive out of award the
principal due with unpaid interest to distribution date, or release of mortgagee lien
against award, award payment to mortgagor and action possibly against mortgage on
notes. Justice Sebring, dissenting at p. 323, argued Shavers was different and
followed Justice Thomas.
134. 75 So.2d 765, 767-68 (Fla. 1954); see note 102 suPra.
135. 59 So.2d 779, 787 (Fla. 1952).
136. 60 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 1952).
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Synthesizing these decisions would seem to lead to a conclusion that
whether the eminent domain power is allied with, or distinguished from,
the spending and disposing powers or the general state police power, the
court's economic philosophy-under such an abstraction as "public use"
or "purpose"-may well cripple any seriously attempted experimental social
legislation' 37 utilizing the eminent domain device.
(VII) The Police Power, Generally
138
Health.-Tbis traditionally regulated subject received slight judicial
attention. In Florida Livestock v. Gladden,3  an act permitting destruc-
tion of diseased aninials, without compensation and under certain conditions,
was interpreted without a constitutional breath of judicial doubt.
Safety.-A number of decisions demonstrated the strength of the safety
police power. In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company v. State40
the court, in validating an act forcing utility relocation of facilities to accom-
modate a new highway, declared that highways provide "one of the clearest
fields for the exercise of the police power." The validity of licensing
of aircraft flights over a city to advertise by sign and sound was
more or less assumed-with a safety basis-in Tatum v. Hallandale.'"1
Perez v. Trifiletti 42 treated the police power in violent labor-management
disputes much the same way. In State v. Kelly14 S the Court probably
validated state legislation on criminal communism by treating answers,
possibly dangerous to questioned witnesses, as privileged under the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court wrote of the link-in-the-chain-of-
evidence theory and judicially noticed that Communist activities were in
the "clear and present danger" stage, authorizing severe governmental
regulation.
Morals.-The police power related to morals went through, this writer
is sure, a shattering experience. In Volusia County Kennel Club v.
137. Ibid.
138. This breakdown probably reflects the distinctions of the Court, expressed
or not. Such emphasis on subject to validate should not be necessary if the Court's
professed limitations on judicial review of police power mean much. See notes
4,5,6 supra.
139. See 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954).
140. 75 So.2d 796, 799 (Fla. 1954)(at utility's expense, too); Wcbb v. Hill,
75 So.2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1954)(same, dictum); State v. Florida State Improvement
Comm'n, 75 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1954) (same, dictum). See Riviere v. Orlando Parking
Comm'n, 74 So.2d 694, 696 (Fla. 1954)(Court stated "committed" to authorizing
off-street parking as an exercise of police power); Pitman v. Florida State Improvement
Comm'n, 78 So.2d 718, 719 (Fla. 1955) (no constitutional provision requires pre-
determined road or bridge location).
141. See 71 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1954).
142. See 74 So2d 100 (Fla. 1954).
143. See 76 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1954)(certainly an indirect validation. Both con-
stitutions involved.) Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation,
53 MiCn. L. REV. 407 (1955) is interesting in this connection.
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Haggard"4 the Court decided, from several legislative statements, that
the race track racket is now the race track business; that the "noxious
odor" no longer registers in the morals police power nostrils. The race
track "business" being presently like any other "business" in Florida, the
legality of regulation thereon will depend on the usual "public purpose",
"reasonable" roadblocks, police power regulation of Florida business seems
to meet. The immediate problem before the Supreme Court was a dog track
race tax based on daily track gross receipts. The Court distinguished the tax
and spending powers, 45 while apparently equating the tax and general
police powers by insistence that the tracks are just ordinary "business."
Another unusual development was insistence on use of the tax power in
connection with "regulation." While it is true, for example, that the federal
tax power presently has a wide police power thrown about it, this has never
been treated by the United States Supreme Court as absolutely niecessary. 1'"
In relation to protection of the "public against loss from fraudulent
or unscrupulous practices in commercial and financial transactions, particu-
larly where the thing dealt with, or the method of dealing with it, adopts
itself to . . . fraudulent impositions on the public," the Court located
ample police power to permit regulation of hotel advertising. 47
Reasonable limitation of the police power regulation of liquor licenses,
regarding due process procedural revocation, was obtained in Kline v. State
Beverage Department.'4 8 Formal recognition of property qualities in such
licenses, at least for procedural purposes, should stabilize the judicial and
administrative outlook toward a business presently well established as part
of the Florida's social and economic scene.
Generally-Miles Laboratories v. Eckerd' 4 again staged the economic
philosophy of the Supreme Court, attendant to review of legislation regulat-
ing private property and contract in a sense not traditional in the state;
traditional, that is, such as legislation requiring fire escapes or setting
public utility rates, and so on. At issue again was the Florida fair trade
agreements law.'50 The Court blocked any possible property or contract
regulation except during an "economic emergency"'' and insisted on
144. 73 So.2d 884, 886 (Fla. 1954) (petition for rehearing at p. 895. Court
refused police power, connected with taxation, to restrict the financial and political
power of the tracks); the Court, at p. 886, required the tax power to do more than
just get revenue; further "regulation" of the tracks was necessary. The Court involved
the federal constitution also.
145. The court has, in effect, limited the tax power by prohibiting spending of
taxes for a non "public purpose"; see State v. Florida State Racing Comm., 70 So.2d
375, 380 (Fla. 1953) (FLA. CorS. Art. IX, § 2).
146. See Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937)(federal
taxation validity approaches a political question).
147. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Assn., 77 So.2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1955).
148. 77 So.2d 872, 874 (Fla. 1955).
149. 73 So.2d 680-682 (Fla. 1954), noted, 9 NIA^i L.Q. 234 (1954).
150. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 NIArNI' L.Q. 174 (1954).
151. This validation language is antique, certainly.
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"free competition" concepts in police power regulation. The Court's
frankness about economic subjectivity in substantive due process was ad-
mirable. The legislature, in effect, was directed that no regulation of this
nature was possible. The Court brushed aside legislative factual findings of
necessity in Justice -lobson's words' 52 as "obviously contrary to proven ...
truths of which courts may take judicial notice." Thus the Court easily
won the battle of constitutional facts. For emphasis, one might compare
Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Association'53 where a severe regulation of
hotel advertising was approved-under the "business affected with a public
interest" and traditional common law power over fraud abstractions-with
the legislature given a wide power over "social legislation," the question
of regulation reasonableness left to the legislature and a legislative factual
finding restricted independent judicial notice.
The power of the legislature over municipalities was stated to be
plenary, 54 with the possible exception of municipal regulations of property
which would pain the court if the legislature attempted the same directly. 5
A similar plenary legislative power was authorized over the establishment,
abolishment and compensation of certain state offices.'" Legislative control
over entrance to "certain professions in the state" was referred to in
several cases.57  The position of the Florida Court on legislative election
regulation was somewhat inconsistent. 58 The legality of legislation retro-
actively affecting private contracts was generally denied on the differentiated
constitutional grounds of impairment of contract and lack of police power
(substantive due process) 169
152. Concurring at p. 682.
153. 77 So.2d 465, 467-68 (Fla. 1955).
154. North Shore Bank v. Surfside, 72 So.2d 659, 662 (Fla. 1954) (FLA. CONST.
Art. VIII, § 8). See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Miami, 72 So.2d 270, 272 (Fla.
1954), where the city attempted to invalidate an act exclusively authorizing commission
to set rates of local utility. A galaxy of constitutional arguments failed the city.
155. See Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1954), wherein the court
dealt with city lease of property to private party-a governmental activity the Court
dislikes, see note 102 .'upra. A presumption against finding legislative authorization
for city was maintained and a "municipal" as well as a state "public" purpose was
required. Difficult to determine if case is statutory or constitutional in basis.
156. Graham v. Board of Public Inst., 76 So,2d 874, 876 (Fla. 1955) (Fr.
CoNsr. Art. 111, § 27).
157. State v. Dee, 77 So.2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1955); Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d
676, 678 (Fla. 1954).
158. Wagner v. Gray, 74 So.2d 89, 90 (Fla. 1954) (here "inherent power" was
referred to: "election of officers", in Art. XVI, § 8, did not apply to primary so a
plurality is unnecessary). Erwin v. Richardson, 70 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1954)
(here the "right" to vote was emphasized; that the legislature could not "unduly
limit." An act attempted to nominate county commissioners by district rather than
county at large. See FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 26; Art. VIII, § 5); sec Singletary v. State,
69 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954) for a fine description of judicially controlled county commis-
sioner district reapportionment under FI.A. CoNSr. Art. VIII, § 5.
159. In these cases both federal and state constitutional arguments were used;
although rarely distinguished. The same is true for the substantive due process and
contract impairment principle.
Contract Impairment: In Shavers v. Duval, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954) the problem
was the eminent domain impact on the contract impairment restriction, on how to
compensate a mortgagee. See notes 130, 131, 132 supra. That private contracts are
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(VIII) Conclusion
The state police power is not presently at the strength one would
expect in a modern non-agrarian state. The Florida Supreme Court's
distaste for analysis is probably one reason. From the cases it is impossible
to determine if there is one general police power or a number of powers
tenuously related to some vague general police power. The court's uneasy
use of the legislative presumption of correctness adds to the haze. The
general power of government was as uncertain, perhaps, in the human
"rights" area, as in the property "rights" area. 6 0  Since a valid police
power exertion, in the last analysis, must not be "unreasonable" and
since that test almost directly will mirror the justices' personal tastes and
distastes, it is not "unreasonable" to state that incorrect usage of presump-
tions in the police power field results in a vast increase in judicial power.'6 1
made in view of eminent domain powers decided the case. The impairment principle
was subjected, in dictum, to the police and tax powers. Watts v. Duval, 75 So.2d 316
(Fla. 1954) was similar. Due process and contract impairment not distinguished. In
State v. Coral Cables, 72 So.2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1954), in which the city had pledged
its anticipated cigrette tax funds collected under a state law, the Court stated that
such a law could not be modified or repealed to impair a contract to service bonds.
Baughmam v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 78 So,2d 694 (Fla. 1955), stated that a
lawyer's compensation contract was subject to a then existing law permitting court
to determine fee. Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954), involved a
law, cancelling all reverter provisions in deeds in effect over 21 years, which the Court
invalidated under contract impairment and due process. In Yaffee v. International Co.,
80 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1955) at issue was validity of repeal of law disallowing usury
defense to corporations, which repeal followed the contract sued upon. Held an
impairment under both constitutions. Court restated the substantive-procedural
terminology.
160. For convenience to readers here are collected several of the more important
decisions in the power of the state v. constitutional "civil rights" field. Labor freedom
of speech is exhaustively developed (from a conservative standpoint) in the Labor Law
Survey article in this issue, see the comment, Labor Relations, Free Speech for Whom?
10 MIAMt L.Q. 37 (1955). A representative decision was Sax Enterprise v. Hotel
Employers Union Local No. 255, 80 So.2d 602-605 (Fla. 1955) in which the Cotrt
affirmed its "unlawful purpose" test in this sensitive social field. Apparently, picketing
is for an unlawful purpose and beyond the pale of freedom of speech unless the union
has established that the employees have chosen it their representative, the employer has
been informed of the object of the picket line and afforded an opportunity to negotiate,
and the pickets do not give out false information. Of course, in Florida there seems
to be no legal machinery to enforce a representative election so it is quite possible that
unless the United States Supreme Court rides to the rescue there is no effective labor
freedom of speech in a Florida picket line, formed to organize. An interesting article
is Price, Picketing-a Legal Cinderella, 7 U. of FLA. L. REv. 143 (1954).
Other judicial restrictions on speech include Huie v. Lewis, 71 So.2d 498, 499
(Fla. 1954) (possibly press, too) in which the circuit court denied petitioner entrance to
interview a defendant in a murder trial to prepare a story for magazines and newspapers.
The presumption against the governmental regulation of the speech area certainly was
not evident in the case, the court stating that petitioner "shows no other interest in
the case. Ile is not an attorney . . . for the prisoner and he is not related to
her - . . ." State v. Lewis, 80 So.2d 685, 686 (Fla. 1955) applied the "clear and
present danger test" to validate a contempt commitment of petitioner for attempting
to influence a court "agent." On the facts the decision was sound, except for the
fact that the same judge whose character was assaulted by the words tried the charge.
Also validated was a legislative regulation on hotel advertising, see note 147 supra.
Once again the decision, on the facts, was attractive (fraud possibilities were curbed).
161. See, generally, Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (19091;




(1) Administrative Due Process'
0 2
0
The interaction between substantive (police power) due process and
procedural due process is quite interesting. The cases illustrate that the
state police power strength definitely relates to the strength of procedural
due process.
163
There were several administrative cases in which the regulated indi-
vidual received no hearing. In 1954, the Court6 4 held in a case in which
a master foreman's license was revoked without notice or hearing by a
city board of plumbing examiners that under the particular facts no hearing
was necessary. i the peculiar state of the pleading the then ex-plumber
admitted never being lawfully initially entitled to receive the license; in
effect lie requested that the Court order the city board to issue the license,
subsequently having a hearing to determine the legality of the license
revocation. The Court stated that under these circumstances a notice
and hearing was not necessary before revocation, although a city ordinance
required notice and hearing. Certainly, under facts showipg no admission
that the initial licensing was illegal, a notice and hearing should be
required. In State v. Carbonelli'05 the Court required no hearing when a
village judge was removed from office under a charter permitting such
action by the council at any time and without cause. The decision was
sustained on the theory that the judge had no "right." The use of the
"privilege-right" terminology is unfortunate since it generally conceals
the real basis of the decision-there obviously being some reason why the
situation is characterized as one or the other. However, on the facts, the
decision was defensible since civil service requirements were absent.66
In Kline v. State Beverage Department of Florida,67 the Court sur-
prisingly' required notice and hearing before revocation of a liquor license,
on the theory that such a license had sufficient property qualities about it,
at least for procedural due process purposes. The Court also apparently
desired a statement of reasons for the revocation. Perhaps the decision
announces a new restrictive Court policy over the traditionally large state
police power""' and such subjects as liquor; that power may not be per-
mitted to sustain summary administrative procedures. At the time of
issuance of the present license it was true that on the record the license
was rather definitely shown to be illegal under existing state law.
162. See generally, Stone, An Introduction to the Administrative Process, 6 MIAMI
L.Q. 281 (1952).
163. See, generally, McKennon, Due Process of Law and Economic Legislation-
North Carolina Style, I DUKE L.J. 51 (1951).
164. State v. Dunne, 71 So,2d 716 (Fla. 1954).
165. 80 So.2d 913, 914 (Fla. 1955).
166. See Johnson v. Trader, 52 So.2d 333. 336 (Fla. 19511.
167. 77 So.2d 872, 874 (Fla. 1955) (constitution or statutes, the basis?)
168. See Holloway v. Schott, 64 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1953).
169. In line with a general weakening of the state tax power over gambling; see
Volusia County Kennel Club v. Haggard, 73 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1954).
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There were several cases in the last two years which involved adminis-
trative hearings incomplete in some detail. In two of these, the judicial
concern was over varying uses of judicial notice by the administrative
hearing officer. In Jackson v. Mayo170 the petitioner was released from
prison on parole under supervision of the Florida Parole Commission;
that Commission issued to petitioner notice charging violation of the
parole which on its face had required petitioner to -avoid injurious habits"
and not to "associate with persons of harmful character." At the hearing
the Commission did not introduce evidence but took judicial notice of
an investigator's report which was part of its files. The statute authorized
revocation when the Commission had "reasonable ground" to believe a
parolee had violated his parole. The statute also provided that the state
and the parolee could enter evidence at the hearing. The Court insisted
upon a hearing of a fuller nature under the statute even if not "formal in
nature". The basis for the decision seemed to be, at least partially, pro-
cedural due process, in the sense that the charges should be known to
the parolee who should have an opportunity to meet them by competent
evidence, and be heard by counsel upon the probative force of the evidence
adduced by both sides. Running through the decision there seemed to
be an indication that the legislature constitutionally could have abolished
a hearing altogether in parole situations, obviously referring to the great
state police power, in the premises. However, where a hearing is required
by statute the Court apparently will insist that due process requirements
be met in interpretation of the statutory hearing requirement.
Seaboard Airline R.R. Co. v. Gay' 71 was a very interesting recent case.
Several administrative hearings were involved. In the first, the State
Comptroller gave plaintiff notice of a hearing to consider valuation of
plaintiff's property. The officer announced he had assessed the property
at a certain figure, thereby not accepting the plaintiff's evaluation. The
plaintiff was then noticed of another hearing before the Railroad Assess-
ment Board. At that hearing the plaintiff offered evidence; the Railroad
Assessment Board did not. That Board accepted the Comptroller's figure.
The Court held that the Comptroller could make up his mind without
evaluating plaintiff's evidence and arguments since his conclusion was not
binding on the Board, indicating that every hearing does not have to be
a full hearing where there are a series of hearings in an administrative
process. The Court further held that due process did not require such a
board be bound by evidence, as a matter of record, in property assessment
hearings. In assessment matters, therefore, the assessment board may
depend on the "best information" available, including judicially noticing
the judgment of employees. Only notice and the opportunity to be heard
were required under the statute and due process, and the administrative
170. 73 So.2d 881 (Fa. 1954).
171. 74 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1954).
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officer could use his "informed judgment." The administrative decision
was apparently sustained because the Court realized a de novo review was
possible with only a "presumption" in favor of the validity of the assessment
in the Court. The Court indicated due process would require this under
these circumstances. Also mentioned, in passing, was the fact that Board
members did not have to submit themselves to cross examination con-
cerning the basis for their assessment. The Court properly put their deter-
mination beyond a judicial veil. 1 2
The Court in In Re Smith173 permitted the Florida Hotel and Res-
taurant Commission to suspend a hotel license, with the suspension based
on evidence of a possibly illegal nature. Florida law permits the Hotel
Commission to suspend any hotel license when gambling operations are
found to be carried on in the hotel. The Commission also has the power
to inspect every hotel without warrant. In this case, a deputy hotel com-
missioner, after obtaining entrance to the hotel, was refused admittance
to certain rooms by the hotel operator, a colored man. The Commissioner
seized him and used abusive language, enabling the Commissioner to enter
the rooms. The Court recognized the abuse and the severity of the search
but permitted the admittance of the evidence to sustain the license
revocation. Fortunately the Court also related the decision to the fact
that "a licensee who obtained . . . a license as such as herein involved
becomes bound to . . . conform with the . .. statute," a possible constitu-
tional waiver in advance, then.
In a 1954 decision17' the Court stated that when the plaintiff company
was denied a building permit to construct a gasoline station on its property
by a city building inspector, and the inspector acted after receiving a
letter, adverse to the application, from the city commission who employed
him, the action of the inspector was valid. The record indicated the
inspector realized he had discretion regardless of the letter.
The only observation that the writer can make on the Florida
administrative due process field is that the Florida Supreme Court when
weakening procedures, ordinarily necessary for due process in administra-
tive hearings, generally relates the weakening to either the strength of the
state police power over the subject matter, some fiction such as the
"privilege-right" dichotomy, or to the fact of a subsequent court review
which will reflect procedural due process.
(II) Judicial Due Process (Civil)
Notice-The Court, in Moore v. Lee,1" an original action for custody
of a child in which a petition was filed to modify a former decree, after
the time for final appeal had run, ruled on the notice necessary. The original
172. See Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
173. 74 So.2d 353-355 (Fla. 1954); noted 9 MaMi L.Q. 108 (1954).
174. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1954).
175. 72 So.2d 280, 282 (Fla. 1954).
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decree had retained jurisdiction of the cause. More than eight months
had passed from the final decree and no notice was served upon the de-
fendants by mail, or otherwise. Only a copy of the petition to modify
was sent to the former attorney of record. The Court held that in pro.
ceedings of this sort the defendant was not entitled to actual service of
process but was unquestionably entitled to "an adequate and proper notice
of the new proceedings." The Court would not presume that the attorney
of record for a party in an action, after the original appellate period had
run, still had authority to bind the party in subsequent proceedings to
modify. In another case, Mullin v. County of Polk,"76 the issue was the
legality of a deed from a county when the property was acquired in a
suit to quiet title for delinquent taxes. The statutory procedure directed
the clerk to mail to the person claiming title to the property a copy of
a newspaper containing notice that suit had been started, if the name and
address of that owner appeared on the tax roll. If this were impossible,
then the notice was to be mailed to the person last paying taxes on the
property, according to the tax collector's receipt book. In this case there
had been an error in the receipt book and the notice was never received.
The issue was whether due process required more. It was stated that it
would be "an intolerable burden on the clerk" to make independent
examination in every case to determine if the information in the collector's
office was accurate. The Court indicated that with an action in rem such
notice was legal if the statutory procedure was followed. Perhaps the entire
case is conditioned on the factor that the state tax police power was
involved.
The International Shoe case' 77 possibilities were not extended by the
Court in Gessler v. Gessler,178 in which a child custody proceeding was
brought by the father who established his Florida domicile with his
minor children. The action was against the mother, a resident of Penn-
sylvania; the mother having forcibly taken the children back to Pennsyl-
vania. Constructive service was obtained on the defendant. The Court
held that "when the custody of minor children is involved they must be
in the jurisdiction of the Court before the question will be considered."
In a somewhat dissimilar situation",, the Court permitted the Secretary
of State to accept service of process, under a law so authorizing him, fox
non-residents doing business in the state. The statute was here applied
to defendant non-residents who had purchased an orange grove in Florida
and listed it with the plaintiff for sale. The plaintiff sued on that listing
contract. The Court followed the modem trend in validating this pro-
cedure and utilized the International Shoe Company approach in finding
176. 76 So.2d 282, 284 (Fla. 1954).
177. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
178. 78 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1955)(The mother's Florida activity was striking, to
say the least).
179. See State v. Register, 67 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1953).
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the "certain minimum contacts" with the state necessary so the suit main-
tenance did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
The International Shoe Company language was also decisive in Mason
v. Mason Products Co.,'8 0 in which service of process was attempted on a
foreign corporation by service upon the corporation's salesman, who had
a tenuous relation with the defendant in that the salesman was not paid
on a regular basis, had only taken two orders for the defendant, and was
under no supervision. The Court cited the International Shoe Company
case in determining that the "contacts" here were not substantial enough;
the relationship between the salesman and the defendant was such that he
had no "legal or moral duty to report and properly handle a summons served
on him as agent" of the defendant.
Hearing-The legality of judicial notice and hearing was passed upon
in several recent cases. In one case,' 8' the plaintiff was expelled from
membership in a private country club without notice of charges and
without hearing. The by-laws of the club permitted such an expulsion.
The Court determined that expulsion of private club members cannot be
accomplished in this manner. Partially, the Court reached this result on
the basis of "principles of natural justice". The Court also determined
that the statute under which the club was incorporated demanded the
same. Probably the Court was determining that the judiciary in Florida
will insist upon certain procedural requirements with reference to expulsion
of private club members.
At issue in Atkinson v. Atkinson18 2 was the applicability of Rule 3.15,
1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule authorized an attachment
against a party, upon the affidavit of his adversary, when that party failed
to perform a "specific act." The plaintiff's wife in a divorce suit had
obtained a decree ordering defendant to pay certain sums for the support
of their minor children. Subsequently she filed with the clerk of the circuit
court an affidavit setting out the date, and amount of the last payment, and
the sum the defendant was in arreas. The clerk issued a writ of attachment
directed to the sheriff ordering him to take the defendant into custody
and to detain him until compliance. The Court reflected that serious con-
stitutional problems would be involved without a notice and hearing with
a situation as here presented. Apparently the rule should only be applied
to simple acts such as a failure to execute a conveyance, while more
complicated facts ("Myriads of situations that might [be involved in
justification of such a nonpayment and the] varying possible punishments
. . . calling for a considered judgment" made the difference) require
180. See 67 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1953).
181. LaGorce Country Club v. Cerani, 74 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1954); noted
a FLA. L. REv. 125 (1954).
182. 80 So.2d 464.465 (Fla. 1955).
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full hearing. In State v. Amidon'83 the Supreme Court held that a criminal
court of record lacked jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc order for
inclusion of a provision for forfeiture of money, alleged used in a lottery,
in the judgment and sentence. The Court stated that an adjudication in
a court of proper jurisdiction based on notice and hearing would be
necessary before such a forfeiture would be valid. Agreement between
parties did not change the conclusion. It is difficult to determine whether
the Florida constitution or statutes were referred to in sustaining this
decision.
The Court also validated, in Belcher v. Florida Power & Light Co.,184
the statutory speedy procedure in eminent domain for obtaining possession
of property heretofore similarly validated in State Road Department v. Fore-
hand.""5 This law permits a speedy procedure under which defendants
have counsel, appraisers are appointed and proper monies paid into court.
In the Betcher case, the Court permitted the clothing of a public service
corporation with the special power of condemnation.
In State v. Lewis,18 6 the Court missed an excellent opportunity to
develop a judicial procedural due process measure when the same judge
tried a case "involving a personal assault on his character"; as pointed out
by Justice Terrell, concurring, such an attack is practically impossible of
judicial determination without a "show of resentment and all that such an
impulse leads to. When there is this danger, he should not hesitate to
request that another judge take his place." Justice Terrell did not suggest
this on a due process basis.
Review-In Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Gay,18 the Court in a pro-
ceeding on petition for a writ of certiorari to review an order of the
Railroad Assessment Board stated that a full determination of all questions
in the circuit court and appellate review in the Florida Supreme Court
was "due process of law." In a more recent case188 the Court came to a
like conclusion in another assessment situation, apparently requiring as
part of due process, a de novo review of the hearing procedures, conclusions
and findings of fact on the administrative side, with reference to assess-
ments. This definitely was necessary as the Court, unfortunately, had not
required adequate due process procedures in the administrative hearings
which preceded the court review. In Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co. 8 0 the
Court held that the law providing that orders of the full Industrial Com-
mission be subject to review only by writ of certiorari, filed in the Florida
Supreme Court, was not unconstitutional in abrogating the right to appeal.
183. 68 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 1953).
184. 74 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1954).
185. 59 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1952).
186. 80 So.2d 685, 694 (Fla. 1955).
187. 68 So.2d 591, 594 (Fla. 1953).
188. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gay, 74 So.2d 569, 572 (Fla. 1954).
189. 69 So.2d 659, 661 (Fla. 1954).
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The Court stated that the right to appeal is not "essential to due process
of law" at least in the fullest sense of those words. However, apparently
some type of review would be necessary under due process-a fuller review
than certiorari to a lower court of record, since there "the parties have
had their day in a ... court."
(III) Judicial Due Process (Criminal)
The Court determined a number of factors to be a part of the total
picture of adequate criminal judicial due process in Florida. In Jefferson
v. Sweat'90 the Court stated that the legislature could enact that one
fact be presumptive or prima facie evidence of another fact, if there was a
rational connection between the two, so that the inference was not un-
reasonable and the accused was afforded a fair opportunity to make his
defense in rebuttal. Justice Terrell stated this did not take from defendant
his presumption of innocence since he could, with any proof he had, rebut
the state's prima facie case. Under this language it would seem the state,
within rational bounds, could shift the burden of proof. At issue in the
case was the federal statute taxing gambling in relation to a state law
which stated in effect that the holding of a federal tax stamp for gambling
would be held in the state courts as prima facie evidence of violation
of the state gambling laws, and that upon production of the stamp,
a grand jury could indict the holder without further proof. On
rehearing, 1 1 Justice Matthews stated that in this case there was no evidence
of any gambling, only possession of the gambling stamp, and that was not
sufficient, since one presumption cannot be the basis of another. The
Court insisted upon independent proof that the gambling laws had been
violated.192
In another case' 13 at issue was whether the defendant was de-
nied the right to a "fair and impartial trial by the refusal of the trial court
to order a change of venue." The motion filed for defendant was supported
only by her affidavit and the certificate of her counsel that "he has investi-
gated the prospects of procuring supporting affidavits and it is impracticable,
and he believes impossible because of the hostile sentiments existing in
Swannee County, Florida, against his client." The motion was traversed
by prosecution, with 37 affidavits of citizens to the effect that the defendant
could receive a fair trial. Defendant failed to offer any affidavits or evidence
at the hearing and the Court denied the motion. 4 At best the constitu-
190. 76 So2d 494 (Fla. 1954).
191. Id. at 498. Difficult to determine which constitution involved, or which
particular constitutional phrase.
192. The trial area was a committing officer rather than a trial on the substantive
charges.
193. MeCollum v. State, 74 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1954).
194. Court stated defendant failed to conform to requirements on such motions
because of absence of supporting affidavits and fact that counsel's certificate allegations
were made on belief, not supported by oath or affirmation.
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tional facts offered by the defendant did not demonstrate much significance,
particularly as the lower court's position was aided by careful questioning
of prospective jurors.
The Court in State v. Whisnant1" passed on the adequacy of infor-
mation allegation. The major criteria was the sufficiency of the allegations
to assist defendant in preparing his defense.
On the use of violence to obtain evidence, the Court recently held106
that when an officer merely tapped defendant on the shoulder, exhibited his
badge and said that he wanted to talk to him, the defendant's rather extreme
fear was an abnormal reaction. The Court used the "reaction of a reasonable
man" test here; therefore, the confession was not void for lack of a voluntary
element, or because of violence.
The Court decided two cases,'0 7 in which the competency of de-
fendants to enter a plea of guilty was at issue. In one, the defendant
alleged being under the influence of a drug and therefore not legally com-
petent to enter a plea. In the other, the defendant argued that he had not
realized the consequences of the guilty plea. The Court stated in the latter
case that "the petition was not verified or signed by the petitioner personally,
and he clearly did not come within the rule applied in those cases where,
because of extreme youth, inexperience, illiteracy, etc., a prisoner who pleads
guilty without benefit of counsel may be permitted to withdraw his plea."
The discretion of the trial court obviously should generally control in these
cases.
There were a number of other recent due process (criminal) decisions.
The Court stated 08 that the Legislature "may by special or local law declare
stated things to be unlawful and provide by valid general law a punishment
for failure to abide thereby." However, in all cases the initial law had to
declare the prescribed conduct "unlawful" or to be a "misdemeanor." In
North v. Chapman199 the Court stated "neither the statute nor the Consti-
tution requires that the name or identity of the executioner be further
identified." The statute stated that the executioner should be the first
assistant engineer of the Florida State Prison. Also, at issue in the recent
criminal procedural due process portrait was the validity of a law on
appointment of medical experts to examine the defendant and the experts'
further examination by court and counsel. 200 This was stated not to be
a deprivation of "due process."
195. 80 So.2d 611, 612 (Fla, 1955).
196. Simring v. State, 77 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1955).
197. Stratton v. State, 77 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1955); Shoemaker v. Mayo, 75 So.2d
690 (Fla. 1954).
198. Taulty v. Hobby, 71 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 19541.
199. 74 So.2d 787, 789 (Fla. 1954)(probably a due process issue possibility).
200. McVeigh v. State, 73 So.2d 694 (Fa. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S.
885 (1955). Decision is not very clear.
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Probably the most important decision in the last two years was Sneed
V. Mayo.201 There the Court indicated that when the record in the trial
court did not relate the "steps necessary to constitute due process...
affirmatively reflected by the original transcript . . ." and affirmative state-
ments by a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus alleged a similar lack of
due process procedures, a "sufficient predicate" would have been laid to
entitle the petitioner to a "writ . . . in the first instance." The Court
strongly stated that it was not bound by the record of due process but the
test was whether in fact due process was observed. To put it another way,
the failure of the trial court to observe the law on how to make and record
a waiver of jury was not held "ipso facto" a failure of due process. In
these cases the procedure of the Court has been to refer the habeas corpus
petitions to a circuit judge as a commissioner of the Supreme Court to
take testimony on the issues and report findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
(IV) Clarity or Definiteness of Expression
02
The Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson2 3 passed on a city
ordinance which read that "all of the above listed uses in a business 'A' dis-
trict shall be permitted . . . provided that no operation shall be carried
on which is injurious to the operating personnel of the business or to other
properties, or to the occupants ...by reason of the objectionable ommis-
sion of cinders, dust, dirt, fumes, gas, odor, noise, refuse matter, smoke,
vapor, virbation or similar substances or conditions." The company re-
quested a building permit to build a gasoline filling station on its property.
The record indicated that the building inspector, the board of adjustment,
and the lower court had come to different conclusions on interpretation of
the ordinance. The Supreme Court invalidated the law on that basis, that
it was void for vagueness and was an invalid delegation of legislative power.
These two constitutional principles are quite differentiatable and it is diffi-
cult to determine from the Court's statement which principle the decision
is actually based upon. Perhaps the vagueness only goes to the delegation.
The Court insisted that there be an "intelligible principle" to guide the ad-
ministrative agency, and the law be fixed "with such certainty that they not
be left to the whim or caprice of the administrative agency."
CONSTITUIONA FAcErs OF PROCEDURE20 4
(I) Bait
The Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Section 9 states that
"all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offense
201. 69 So.2d 653-655 (Fla. 1954).
202. One might argue over where to place this section. See Collings, Unconstitutional
Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955).
203. 74 So.2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1954).
204. This assembly of constitutional privileges and rights is as well treated here
as not.
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where the proof is evident or the presumption great." In Lloyd v. State20 5
the Court did not mention this constitutional statement and required the
trial court test for bail to be discretionary ". . . in the light of the facts
and circumstances of each particular case." The trial court judge was
permitted, as an element of that discretion, his desire to "break up this
type of offense." In a habeas corpus proceeding to determine legality of
defendant's detention on a first degree murder charge, without bail, the
circuit court was ordered 206 to permit defendant to examine state's wit-
nesses as to the crime elements, including defendant's state of intoxication
and passion when the crime was committed-this since the problem was
whether the "proof is evident or the presumption is great." Both intoxica-
tion and passion factors, of course, disturb the first degree murder picture
clarity. A "full hearing" was necessary on constitutional bail. This decision,
while not apparently restrictive of law enforcement practices, would seem
excellent to procedurally strengthen the bail privilege.
(I) Jury
In McVeigh v. State,207 a murder trial, the issue was the validity of
a law authorizing appointment of medical experts to examine defendant
and the examination of the experts by court and counsel. It was held not
a deprivation of the constitutional trial by jury. A refusal of a trial court
to order a change of venue, because of impossibility of obtaining a fair
trial in the county, was sustained. 208  The Supreme Court's evidentiary
requirements to support a venue change, with its attendant possibilities of
a less hostile jury panel, perhaps carves the venue change out of the con-
stitutional trial by jury.20 9 The lower court also validly held that a physician-
patient relationship between the murdered doctor and six veniremen was
not objectionable in itself.210 Sneed v. Mayo211 made a second appearance
in the Supreme Court. In that case, the petitioner initially sought to obtain
release from imprisonment on original habeas corpus proceedings in the
Florida Supreme Court. The element of unusualness was that petitioner
convinced the court that a hearing on the merits of his arguments was
imperative. Petitioner's letter to one of the justices mentioned that he was
poor, uneducated, only 21 years old at trial and unfamiliar with things
legal. He insisted he so informed the trial judge and that he objected to
trial without jury. The prison custodian's answer denied the essentials
205. See 79 Sn.2d 778 (Fla. 1955).
206. State v. Kelly, 68 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1953).
207. 73 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 885 (1955). Federal
and state law argued.
208. McCollum v. State, 74 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1954).
209. Perhaps the presumption against the change could be softened-particularly
with minority defendants in cases involving the extraordinary hostility of, say, a small
county. Of course, the due process clause is a possibility, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923).
210. One does feel slightly uneasy on reading this case,
211. 69 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1954). The first time was 66 So.2d 865, 870-871
(Fla. 1953).
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in petitioner's letter. Attached to the answer was a certified copy of what
trial testimony there was and an affidavit by the trial judge to the effect that
petitioner had waived a jury trial. The lower court record showed only
that there was no jury trial. The Supreme Court stated a preference to
rely on the "official court record-the only vehicle through which a court
of general jurisdiction can speak officially." This was silent on any waiver
of the "right" to trial by jury made in "open court." This silence was held
to throw serious doubt on the legality of trial. Obviously, judges would have
to insist that waiver be made in open court and that it appear "affirmatively
either from the record proper or from the transcript." The judge's affidavit
was held incompetent. The burden of proof at the hearing on the merits of
petitioner's claim was placed on the petitioner. Speculation on the num-
ber of records which do not reflect such waivers was fascinating. The Court
on the issues made by the pleading referred the matter for hearing to a
circuit judge as Court commissioner to make findings of fact and law.
That judge found as a matter of actual fact that the petitioner did request
court trial, but that failure to obtain a record waiver required by law de-
manded reversal. The Court in the present case wisely backtracked, placed
the entire problem in a procedural due process setting, and permitted the
actualities at the trial-here a procedurally valid jury waiver-rather than
omissions of record, to control.
(III) Double Jeopardy
There were several cases involving the Florida Constitution, Declara-
tion of Rights, Section 12, which provides that "No person shall be subject
to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." In Bizzel v. State21 2
there was a prosecution for embezzlement, under an information charging
the crime during several months, including September, 1952. At the trial,
and apparently at the defendant's insistence, the state's proof was limited
to time periods other than September. After an acquital a new informa-
tion charged embezzlement during that month. Constitutional double
jeopardy was found under the test "If the facts so charged were found to
be true they would have warranted a conviction upon the first informa-
tion. . . ." So the limitation of proof by the State at the first trial was
meaningless. In Deal v. Mayo,2 13 a Florida law, providing a maximum
punishment of one year for deserting a child or withholding from the child
the means of support, was held to state one offense, with the result that
separation into two counts was double jeopardy. In another case21' the
Court struck down as too indefinite an information, partially using as a
basis of decision that such indefiniteness might lead to "the danger of a
second prosecution."
212. 71 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1954)
213. 76 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1954)
214. State v. Russee, 68 So.2d 897, 898 (Fla. 1953),
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The Supreme Court again 215 stated that where a mistrial was granted
in "absolute necessity in the interest of justice" or on the defendant's
motion, double jeopardy was not an issue. In the case the state tried
to use a witness not listed with defendant and a mistrial was granted
defendant.
(IV) Privilege of Counsel
The Florida Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Section 2, states
that the accused "shall be beard by himself, or counsel, or both." In
the section, supra, on constitutional trial by jury2 6 the second appearance of
Sneed v: Mayo was discussed on that point. In that case the petitioner
also used the constitutional attorney privilege path. He claimed that
he requested counsel, in addition to the allegations already mentioned.
The custodian's answer was similar on this issue, as was the trial judge's
affidavit. The Court spelled out a good deal of general law on this
subject, and, being the latest pronouncement, is of interest. Waiver
was possible when accused was of "mature age and judgment." Otherwise?
There was no absolute duty of court appointment of counsel "for indigent
defendants except where capital punishment is involved." Record silence
inferred that defendant waived benefit of counsel. This amounted to a
presumption, to be overcome by a "showing that the accused was
incapable, because of age, ignorance, or lack of mental capacity, of
representing himself." Defendant's capacity was a factual issue. A
finding on this point by the "trier of facts", supported by evidence of
record, would stand on review. Lack of such "finding" meant the com-
petency issue could be raised in a "post conviction proceeding." The
court made a plea for complete trial transcripts, which was understand-
able. The trial judge's affidavit was held incompetent. The case was set
for hearing on the merits, and the burden on this issue was placed upon
petitioner. It was difficult from reading the decision to determine whether
the conclusion was based upon state or federal constitutional law. The
result of referring the matter to a circuit judge for hearing was a conclusion
by that judge that, in fact, petitioner was competent to "dispense with
the aid of counsel." The Court gave the whole case a strong procedural
due process flavor on the second time around.
In Shay v. State,217 it was indicated that there might have been a
constitutional issue had "the jury believed" the "story" that defcidant was
215. McLendon v. State, 74 So.2d 656, 657 (Fla. 1954); see 8 NlIim L.Q.
183-4 (1954).
216. See note 211 supra. Similar in result was Stratton v. State, 77 So.2d 865
(Fla. 1955), in which defendant alleged pleading guilty without benefit of counsel.
with ignorance of consequences. Upon this motion trial court conducted a hearing,
and motion denied. The Court gave weight to facts that the petition was not
verified or signed by petitioner personally and petitioner-defendant was mature, college-
educated and competent to act for himself. See BEANY, TIlE RICHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS (1955); Fellman, Right to Counsel Under State Law, 55 Wise.
L. Rgv. 281 (1955).
217. 70 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1954).
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not permitted to interview a lawyer from Friday to Tuesday. Of course,
the police denied the story.
EQUAL PROTECTION SITUATION 2 18
The strength of the equal protection limitation on governmental
power to a greater or lesser degree depends upon the relative strength of the
governmental police power? 19  Probably no law is applied to all persons
at one and the same time. Children, the insane, women, men, the un-
healthy, corporations and wage earners, to name a few, have been the
basis of classification in the operation of law. So the basic premise we
start with is that some classifications, in application of law, atc legally
possible. That delightfully vague statement is made even more ephemeral
by the test,220 that a classification is valid unless demonstrated to be not
"reasonable." It would probably be impossible to draw a line between
the "reasonable" of police power exercise and the "reasonable" of equal
protection. Both are, finally, a matter of how the Florida Supreme Court
subjectively thinks. As with the review, by the court, of police power regu-
lations, the review of equal protection situations lies largely in the self-
restraint the court chooses to impose upon itself.
(I) The Non-Negro Cases
221
Where the Florida Supreme Court generally permits large police power
activity in the state the equal protection limitation is quite limp. A good
example is Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State222 where
the Court permitted the legislature to distinguish between railroad and
telephone companies in a law forcing the latter, at their own expense, to
relocate facilities to accommodate construction of a new toll highway. The
decision recognized that highways provide "one of the clearest fields for
the exercise of the police power." The apparently plenary police power
over bar admissions validated one of those uneasy-reading acts providing
admission for a unique class of one individual.223
Zoning classifications had rough judicial treatment during the Survey
period; this is unfortunate since the supposedly strong legislative presump-
tion of validity in zoning must be applied to equal protection as well as
218. The statement in FLA. CONST. Dr.CL. o RIOHTS, § 1, is that "all men are
equal before the law . . ." The federal equal protection clause, applicable to state
action, is found in U.S. CosST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
219. An impressive article on the federal concept can be found in Tussman
and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
220. E.g., Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953). Whether a law is
'reasonable" is still the test for economic due process, see Note, 53 COL. L. Rxv.
6 (1953); Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 1954).
221. This classification is a natural in Florida.
222. See 75 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1954).
223. See Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1954). Justice Terrell, dissenting,
at p. 352, thoughtfully described the act and raised the equal protection-really unequal
privilege-possibility. Similar approach in Fuller v. Watts, 74 So.2d 676, 678
(Fla. 1954).
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police power arguments to be effective. In Charnofree Corp. v. Miami
Beach,224 the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance removing from auth-
orized uses in larger hotels, a number of retail stores, leaving barber shops,
tobacco shops and so on. One of the reasons stated was that equal pro-
tection demands that zoning ordinances treat similarly situated hotels
alike. This ordinance was enacted after the other hotels were constructed.
In these zoning cases225 it was difficult to distinguish (if the Supreme
Court intended that possibility) between the weakness of the state police
power and the strength of the equal protection guarantee.
In the last Survey226 this writer blandly stated that classification under
the state taxation power proved relatively simple to maintain. There has
been a drastic constitutional change, through Volusia County Kennel Club
v. Haggard.22 7  At issue was the validity of an additional tax upon the
dog racing track operators' "take", a tax based upon the amount of daily
gross receipts with a different rate imposed upon each daily pool according
to amount. The argument stressed equal protection under the Florida and
federal constitutions. The Court strongly rejected a police power over
gambling enterprises greater than that over businesses less well regulated
at common law, and this by referring to legislative statements abrogating
the "noxious odor" traditional to gambling. Apparently a tax must do
more than just be classified on the basis of differing income; definitely
some sort of supposed ideal standard of equality would have to be behind
this requirement 228 that all race tracks be treated alike regardless of "take."
On the federal constitution, the Court (amazingly, considering the approach
the same year in Board of Public Instruction v. State), 229 determined to
be controlled by equal protection decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which, as Justice Terrell's dissent 230 stated, could easily be distin-
guished-gambling taxation and grocery taxation being what they are.
On rehearing23' the Court brought the decision partially under a cloak
224. 76 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 1954)(the police power, with reference to zoning,
did not appear in a strong light in case).
225. See Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1954).
226. 8 MIAMI L.Q. 185 (1954)-1 take it all back. In justification, however, it
is easy to point to Smithers v. North St. Lucie River Drainage Dist., 73 So.2d 235
(Fla 1954). There an act attempted (with adequate procedural safeguards) to
reclassify district lands so that, for tax purposes, the more valuable land be distinguished
from the less valuable. The act recited facts to indicate the necessities of the situation.
A correctly used legislative presumption of validity obtained the proper decision. Difficult
to determine which clause(s) of which constitution(s) involved.
227. 73 So.2d 884, 887, 891 (Fla. 1954).
228. Probably that equality damned by Anatole France.
229. 75 So.2d 832, 835-838 (Fla. 1954) (Here the Florida court showed great
hesitancy in following a very clearly written decision of the United States Supreme
Court, and on equal protection, too), see note 238 infra.
230. 73 So.2d 884 890 (Fla. 1954). The Court relied on Stewart Dry Goods
Co. v. Lewis, 294, U.S. 550 (1935) and Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936). These cases do not control economic taxation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, beyond the factual situations involved; see Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141 (1940) and Sholley, Equal Protection In Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REV.,
229, 388 (1938); Berman, The Chain Store Tax, 25 Taxes 627 (1947).
231. 73 So.2d 884, 895 (Fla. 1954).
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of respectability by indicatingl'aa2 that a tax too closely related to income
would run aground on the constitutional income tax bar. The Court
opened one possibility to the legislature by a privilege tax geared to
legislative findings evaluating the particular privilege;233 balancing this,
the Court absolutely closed the judicial door under both constitutions
to any tax based "solely on the amount of the gross receipts of a business
I . . recognized by the Legislature as being a legitimate business." This
statement would seem to foreclose any tax, on practically any business,
which effectively would distinguish income.
In Lynch v .Durrance,2 34 equal protection was stated as an issue under
the "Warren Act," one interpretation permitting local laws to vary state-
wide prohibition of livestock from running at large, in connection with a
uniform basis for tort liability and criminal penalty.
(11). The Negro Cases"5
In the last Survey2 30 this writer stated that in this limited field one can
say that Florida constitutional law and federal constitutional law separate.
The possible local equal protection of the laws restriction on governmental
power was practically nonexistant. The march of the United States Su-
preme Court up the broad equal protection of the laws avenue, with refer-
ence to equal treatment for citizens regardless of color, had not been
matched by the Florida Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court has slowly been crushing the once wide discretionary segregation
fields within the states' police power. The then recent Florida decisions
could not be characterized as particularly sympathetic to the aspirations
of colored citizens to weaken the legal and social segregation frame-
work presently existent in Florida. This attitude on the part of our
highest state court was not unnatural considering the mores of the com-
munity.
Board of Public Instruction v. State23 T presently indicates that Brown
v. Board of Education- s has changed nothing in Florida. Board of Public
Instruction v. State was a school bond issue case in which the Court vali-
dated the purpose of the bonds, even though the proposed school bond
construction program had built in segregation features. The Florida Court
232. 73 So.2d 884, 890 (Fla. 1954)(The court stated "if tl~e increase in the
rate was made to apply to all dog tracks alike" the increase would be constitutional).
233. See LAws oF FLA., c. 29751 (1955).
234. 77 So2d 458, 459-460 (Fla. 1955). Also, in Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So.2d
494, 502 (1954) it was indicated that mere possession of a federal gambling tax stamp
could not be presumptive evidence of probable cause that gambling laws had been
violated, and this is on due process and equal protection grounds. Why was not
discussed.
235. With few exceptions, and this is one, this paper does not deal with the
Florida Supreme Court's determination of federal constitutional law. See LAws
oF FLA" c. 29746 (1955).
23g. 8 MIAMI L.Q. 185 (1954) (footnotes are omitted).
237. 75 So.2d 832-838 (Fla. 1954).
238. 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
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stated that the Brown decision destroyed all legality surrounding public
school segregation; 239 argued that the South is different where ending segre-
gation is concerned (psychological arguments to physical arguments on
local patterns of settlement); mentioned the cost in rendering present plants
useless and sheltered validating the bond issue behind the Brown decision
call for implementation argument. The Court's not unnatural distaste
for the Brown implications was not hidden by reflection that that case "was
a great mistake" and would not be enforced in Florida for "a long time."
The various devices 240 by which states are attempting to avoid Brown
may, it is true, be somewhat efficacious in bridging public opinion gaps.
School construction programs initiated after Brown, however, in deliberately
continuing the segregation social patterns perhaps will solidify the Brown
opposition during what should be the transition period-the argument of
post Brown cost in rendering valueless more buildings being ever-present. 24
School buildings do last a long time.
Justice Mathews 242 brilliantly argued for an end to subterfuge. His
proposition was that the Brown decision definitely invalidated Florida Con-
stitution, Article XII, Section 12, that "white and colored children shall
not be taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be made
for both;" that the entire Florida statutory education framework implements
Section 12 and that, therefore, Brown in effect destroyed the Florida public
education legal structure.243  His statement that there "is no reason why
we should dodge this question or why it should only be discussed behind
closed doors" really demands that the complex social and economic problem
of what Florida citizens want in public education, limited by the Brown
decision, is a political qtiestion, not judicial. Invalidation of Florida Consti-
tion, Article XII, Section 12, would realize just that approach.
In State v. Mayo2 4" the argument was tried by petitioner that the death
penalty imposed on him for murder was discriminatory under both consti-
tutions since that penalty for his crime, in his age group, was only meted
out to those of his race. A statement of the Florida Bureau of Vital
Statistics indicated that during the "12-year period . . . there were 7 deaths
. . . of non-white persons in the 15 to 19 year age group, while . . . no
deaths . . . of white persons in the same age group." Supposedly at fault
was the law permitting a mercy recommendation by a jury. The Court
239. The Brown case did too; see e.g., Segregation in Education, 34 B.U.L. REv.
463 (1954).
240. Nicholson, Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance Proposals,
7 S.C.L.Q. 1 (1954).
241. The Courts cost argument, then, perhaps works both ways.
242. 75 So.2d 832, 840 (Fla. 1954).
243. Another possibility is that the Brown case only invalidated specific segregation
education requirements in Florida law, leaving a riddled, but operative, body of law.
Since the legislative intent throughout the legislative scheme would seem to be in line
with FLA. Co NsT. Art. XII, § 12, invalidation of that Article would seem to tumble the
entirety.
244. 69 So.2d 307-309 (Fla. 1954) (Waiver of constitutional objection, too).
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stated this evidence was of "an inconclusive nature." Certainly more
should be demonstrated to invalidate such a sentence on equal protection
grounds.
To summarize, as the writer has already suggested, the Florida law on
equal protection of the laws and negro segregation doubtless is practicaly
non-existent. At least in practice, federal constitutional law rides pretty
much alone.
2 5
UNREASONABLE SEARCtES AND SEIZURES
In 1953240 this writer stated that this provision247 in our Florida con-
stitution had had a healthy life during the proceeding two years, and that
perhaps after a few more years of such judicial activity law enforcement
officers operating under it would be able to stride confidently up to erring
citizens, march triumphantly into court with the results of a legal search
and seizure and, later, not be disciplined by the Florida Judiciary for a
certain lack of prognostic powers 248-powers which, this writer believed, no
one could demonstrate on then existant materials.249 This legal situation
is still not in hand.
(1). The Automobile Cases
The searches and seizures restriction on government power insures that
in a great number of ordinary police searches there has been a prior en-
245. The real hostility of the Florida Court to the Brown decision is simple to
record: for example, see State v. Kelly, 76 So.2d 798, 803 (Fla. 1954) or Board of
Pub. Inst. v. State, 75 So.2d 832, 838 (Fla. 1954)(the Brown case "was a great
mistake."). Many scholars deny this, i.e., ASnMORE, TnE NErGRo AND THE SCHOOLS
(1954). See also, WILLIAMS AND RYAN, SCHbOOLS IN TRANSITION (1954), for an
interesting sociological survey indicating the resistance to Brown may have been over-
estimated, and detailing procedures to facilitate Brown operation. See Sutherland,
Segregation by Race in Public Schools Retrospect and Prospect, 20 LAW & CONT. PROD.
169 (1955).
The Florida Court very recently in State v. Board of Control, 83 So.2d 20
Fla. 1955), stated that the Court was controlled by Brown, as modified by the United
tates Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The
Florida Court, therefore, took a step toward constitutional legality in relation to equal
protection, education and the negro. In the remainder of the decision the Florida
Court tip-toed, perhaps, in the opposite direction by interpreting the Brown implementa-
tion decision, supra, to apply to a graduate law school. This writer believes the United
States Supreme Court, in implementing Brown, did not intend to inter Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637 (1950). This would seem obvious; see Lucy v. Adams, 76 S. Ct. 33 (1955).
Justice Terell concurred specially in an unusual opinion; see, e.g., TENBROEI, BARNIIART,
MATSON, PREjJUDcE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION, pp. 1-99 (1954) for a stereotype which
led to unusual constitutional results in World War II. Justices Thomas and Sebring
concurred in part and dissented in part; this opinion demonstrates how far the Florida
Court strayed from the federal constitutional path.
246. Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 187 (1954). See
Unpublished Article, Hausler, Search and Seizure in Florida, prepared for 1954 Dade
County Crand Jury, for a conservative view.
247. FLA. CoNsr. D. R., § 22 (1951).
248. I still hesitate to cite Frank. The less controversial Dickenson, in The Law
Behind Law, 29 COL, L. Rzv. 114, 284 (1929), will do as well on rules and judicial
discretion.
249. This was simply because the decisions did not lay out a pattern sufficient
for predictive purposes.
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trance on the scene by a magistrate who has been convinced there is suf-
ficient 250 reason for bothering a citizen and his effects. This checks the
momentum of the police action. However, resort to the search warrant
is impractical in several instances, and the fast moving automobile is one
of these.
In Byrd v. State'5' the sheriff received information, within plenty of
time to obtain a warrant, that a truck was loaded with moonshine. It was
kept under surveillance until driven out at night. The sheriff stopped the
truck simply because of his "information." The officers, in walking about
the truck, discovered a dripping substance which they stated could be
identified as moonshine. They arrested and searched, over the protest of
the appellant (who, incidentally, knew his constitutional law252 ). The
Court stated again the proposition that "a minor traffic violation cannot
be used as a pretext to stop a vehicle and search it for evidence of violation
of other laws," and that this included a check for driver's license.258  The
officer may only search, without warrant, when he can demonstrate "he
had 'probable cause' for his acts or 'reasonable belief' or 'trustworthy in-
formation' that the car was engaged . . ." in an unlawful activity. This test
is essentially that of the 1953 decision, Collins v. State;2" in comment-
ing255 on that case this writer indicated that since this was the language of
the law on issuance of search warrants, an officer must have had sufficient
reasons to convince a magistrate a warrant should issue, if the officer had
applied for one, to arrest and subsequently search. On the theory that
the unauthorized stopping did not vitiate all official activity thereafter at-
tempted, the state argued that since the officer saw and smelled the leaking
moonshine, an arrest was properly made-validating the search. The
Court determined by judicial notice that an officer's sense of smell cannot
distinguish only moonshine'liquor, and transport of all liquor is not illegal.
The Court did admit the constitutional unusualness of the smell from
dwellings wherein moonshine is manufactured. The lack of "probable cause"
to arrest here invalidated the search. 56
Earlier the Court held in Mitchell v. State,217 that the action of a car
driver in throwing bolita packages into brush permitted arrest and search.
250. Qualitatively this depends on the particular state policy.
251. 80 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955).
252. 80 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 1955)("... nobody going in there without a
search warrant.").
253. In Ippolito v. State, 80 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1955), failure to obey a stop sign
was not adequate to initiate arrest and search for lottery materials.
254. 65 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 1953).
255. 8 MIMMI L.Q., 188 (1954).
256. Similar was lppolito v. State, 80 So.2d 332 (Fla. .1955) in which officers
in a nondescript car, while dressed in plain clothes, oidered appellant to stop after
violation of a stop-sign. A chase was had; the Court determined that under the circum-
stances appellant, never apprised of officer's identity, could flee because of fear of
foul play.
27. 60 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1952).
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In 1955, Ippolito v. State-5 8 was distinguished when lottery materials were
knocked from the appellant by violence after a car chase had ended. The
voluntary element seemed decisive.
(II). Statutory Consent (and othenvise)
The state police power is broad enough to condition hotel licensing
so that acceptance of the license authorizes the Florida Hotel and Restaurant
Commissioner to inspect hotel premises without warrant. In one case 250
deputy sheriffs and deputy hotel commissioners were refused entrance to
a hotel. After obtaining entrance the officers were refused permission to
search certain rooms until one commissioner coerced the hotel operator.
The Court thoughtfully discussed this statutory search field, stating that
inspection of premises was tolerated only in connection with the commis-
sion duties, which duties included suspension of licenses for violation of
gambling laws. The search was not limited to public hotel portions and
argument that a guest or operator occupied room did not deter. The "right"
of search was as if officers came "equipped with a warrant." Does this mean
as limited somehow by the particularity of the warrant language? Justice
Terrell,' 6 concurring, suggested the test for warrant necessity here depends
on whether a raid or an ordinary inspection tour is involved. Dayton,
Associate Justice, in his dissent, 2 1 kindly reviewed the record which did
raise a strong implication that this inspection was more than "for the
purpose of looking at the window screens, lighting fixtures, fire escapes .
and so on.
(II). Arrest and Search
Here, as in the automobile cases, a valid arrest eliminated the search
warrant necessity. In Baglio v .State,1 -2 the defendant ran from a jewelry
store show window, chased by a screaming employee. A policeman cor-
nered the runners and arrested the defendant who threw her bag down
saying that now the officer had the bag would he please let her go. The
Court validated the arrest under these facts, and the decision scarcely admits
argument. In Melton v. StateO- 3 the arresting officer obtained information
on defendant's activities by sending someone to buy moonshine from her.
Several days after the officer obtained a search warrant he went to the
home of defendant, informed her of his mission and, after reading the war-
rant to her in the kitchen, pulled aside a rug and located the moonshine.
The warrant was invalid for search purposes. The questions were whether
a lawful arrest was affected by service of the invalid search warrant and
258. 80 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1955).
259. See In re Smith, 74 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1954), noted in 9 MIAMI L.Q. 108
(1954). See also 8 MtAMI L.Q. 191 (1954).
260. Id. at 356.
261. Id. at 358-60.
262. 75 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1954).
263. 75 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954) (unlawful possession and concealment of moonshine).
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whether there was "probable cause" for arrest independent of the search
warrant. The Court stated that even though the search warrant stated
an order for the person named, it was conditioned on the officer first finding
the property described. As for the second question, an officer could "arrest
without warrant when he has reasonable grounds to believe . . . a felony has
been or is about to be committed. . . ." The Court permitted these facts
to pass that test, but once again 26' held that the intention of the arresting
officer controls. Here that officer only intended to arrest if he located the
moonshine, making the arrest incidental to the search result. This type of
distinction must, to understate, disturb law enforcement officers.
Until recently, the Court has refused to pass on the necessity of relating
the seized property and the crime for which the defendant is arrested .265
Courington v. State266 probably signals a change. In Courington, an officer
appeared after an automobile accident and arrested defendant for drunken
driving. Witnesses informed the officer that the defendant had placed
some papers in the car trunk, and a search turned up gambling implements.
The Court insisted that the search had to be "appropriately incident to
making effective a lawful arrest for driving while intoxicated." The search
here was only made after witnesses had informed. Justice Roberts, dis-
senting, pointed out 267 the Court had been equating the Florida and federal
decisions in search and seizure and that the federal rule permitted an
adequate search as incident to making a valid arrest.26  Persons so arrested
could be searched to find articles which were the means of crime committed,
or could possibly aid in escape; he also stated that seizure of instruments
of a wholly unrelated crime was valid where the articles were contraband,
as here. Justice Roberts, therefore, would ignore the reasonableness of the
search and the time involved within which to obtain a search warrant, as
beside the point. I-e indicated that the officer, through the witnesses'
words, had justification to arrest.
(IV). Conclusion
The Court decided several miscellaneous cases during this Survey
period. In Townsend v. State,269 some law on seizures was pronounced.
A beverage department officer had information for several weeks that a
truck would carry illegal liquor. He stopped the truck, arrested the driver,
and seized the liquor without warrant. He maintained he could see the
264. See Kramer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952).
265. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla. 1953). See Laws of Fla., c. 29774
(S.B. 402)(effective July 1 1955).
266. 74 So.2d 652, 6?3 (Fla. 1954).
267. Id. at 654.
268. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), annotated, 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 125 1950).
269. 76 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1955)(decided on statute?). See Laws of Fla., c. 29665
(May 17, 1955) and Laws of Fla., c. 29676 (Aug. 2, 1955); See Laws of Fla., c.
9712 (May 30, 1955).
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liquor after the truck stopped and that he received consent to search. The
unlawfulness consisted in liquor transportation in quantities of more than
12 bottles, except for certain classes of parties specifically excepted in the
law. The state failed to show that these exceptions were here not involved
(i.e., such as that defendant was no common carrier). The Court refused
seizure and forfeiture unless a law authorizing same was strictly followed.
The law as to valid search was here severed from the law of valid seizure-
neither being a ground to validate the other. The sufficiency of a search
warrant was discussed in one decision.27 0  In another case 271 permission
was given a police officer to search an automobile and over 24 hours later
two other officers searched, with a holiday as the intervening day. It was
held that the consent apparently went to the entire police force and, in a
time sense, was still valid.2 72
SELF-INCIMMINAnON
(I) Criminal Communism
Self-incrimination in Florida in the last two years has been a
fruitful decision area. In State v. Kelly278 the petitioners were held in con-
tempt, and committed to jail for refusing to answer questions before a
grand jury. All petitioners claimed the privilege under the Fifth Amend-
inent to the United States Constitution and Section 12, Declaration of
Rights, Florida Constitution. The questions concerned the witnesses'
contacts with the Communist party or associations affiliated therewith;
the witnesses' acquaintance with persons allegedly members of such organiza-
tions; and meetings attended by the witnesses at which alleged members
of such organizations were present. The Florida Supreme Court equated
in meaning, for interpretative purposes, the Fifth Amendment privilege
and the Florida privilege; stating in parallel fashion that the federal Smith
Act and the Florida legislation on criminal communism should receive
similar interpretative treatment. The Court determined from federal de-
cisionsrr 4 that under the operation of the federal privilege such questions
as these, in federal proceedings, would incriminate the witnesses; the
Florida legislation (similar in effect to the Smith Act) in connection with
these questions, therefore, would provide a link in the chain of evidence
which could be used to incriminate the witnesses. In this determination
the Court apparently validated the Florida legislation on criminal com-
munism and determined that the Communist party activities were in the
270. Bonner v. State, 80 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1955). The warrant alleged a house
was in the city on a street when it was in the county; only one such street was in
county and Court emphasized officers had before them a "designation that points ...
to the exclusion of all others ....
271. Shay v. State 70 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1954). Two other voluntary consent cases
were James v. State, 80 So.2d 699 (Fla. 1955); Simring v. State, 77 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1955).
272. Recent article in field was Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable
Search and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REv. 621 (1955).
273. 76 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1954).
274. Such as Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1950).
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clear and present danger area, from a judicial notice standpoint of world
conditions, legislative findings of fact in Florida, and analogous congressional
findings of fact. Apparently, therefore, the Florida Supreme Court will
interpret the Florida privilege against self-incrimination as the United
States Supreme Court interprets the federal privilege. 27 5
(II) Immunization Problems
76
Florida's immunization statute states that: "no person shall be excused
from . . . testifying . . . upon any investigation, proceeding or trial, for a
violation of any of the statutes of this state against . . . gaming or
gambling . . . upon the ground . . . that the testimony . . . may tend to
convict him of a crime or to subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, but
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction . ... concerning which he may so
testify . . . and no testimony so given or produced shall be received
against him . . . This law was recently interpreted by the Florida Supreme
Court in State v. Kelly.277 The ultimate issue was whether the defendant
could remain silent because of possible self-incrimination in the state
courts. The problem was whether the statute applied since the investiga-
tion of the Grand Jury, which questioned the defendant, was on the
subject of conspiracy to violate the gambling laws and conspiracy is not
mentioned specifically in the statute. The Court stated that "the statute
has no application where the subject matter of the investigation is only
into an offense not specified in the statute . . . . If the subject matter
of the investigation . . . had been only a conspiracy to violate the gambling
laws, the immunity statute would have had no application, such investigation
being only into an offense not specified iii and subordinate to the offenses
ennumerated .... " That, however, was not the situation here. The
subject matter was an investigation into gambling activities and it appar-
ently did not matter that the related subordinate offense was also involved;
therefore, the statute being applicable to gambling, it afforded the im-
munity as to "any possible disclosure of a related conspiracy to violate the
275. In Boynton v. State, 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954), the defendant typically
interposed the self-incrimination phraseology of both the Federal and Florida constitu-
tions. Involved in the case was the Florida self-incrimination-immunization statute.
The Court throughout the decisional language worried over the interlocking effect
of the two privileges, so that the witness possibly would be injured by an immunity
statute of one or the other government. 'IThe Court failed to determine whether
federal decisions indicate one cannot plead self-incrimination on the ground that his
testimony may be used to incriminate in the State courts. Definitely, the Florida
Court insisted that the testimony given by the witness in the federal system under
pressure of immunization from penalty cannot be used to prosecute in Florida courts;
see also State v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 387, 895 (Fla. 1954). The Court stated that the
Florida constitutional provision against self-incrimination "protects against the use of
testimony compelled under Federal law." The possible interlocking effect of the
two constitutional privileges, therefore, is at present in a rather curious state. See
note, 26 TENip. L.Q. 64 (1953).
276. Ibid. See Federal Anti-Subversive Legislation of 1954, 55 COL. L. REv. 632
(1954).
277. 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
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gambling laws." So the statute applied. Then the issue became whether
the immunity was restricted to offenses mentioned in the statute or "to
the offenses necessarily revealed or in answer responsive to an eliciting
relevant question." The Court construed "transaction" to refer to "testi-
mony . . relevant to . . . (and having a) substantial connection with
the subject of inquiry." The testimony therefore had to be "relevant to
such subject matter." Similarly in State v. Pearson278 defendant was
informed against for conspiracy to violate lottery laws of the state. The
defendant argued that during a grand jury investigation his private records
were taken from his home in response to a subpoena from the jury. The
defendant also appeared before the body and testified in answer to questions,
arguing this immunized him from prosecution under the Florida immuniza-
tion law. The issue was whether, when such a defendant simply alleged
testifying "concerning gambling" before a grand jury that returned the
indictment upon which the information was based, the writ of prohibition
should issue to stop the criminal court from trying defendant for con-
spiracy to violate the state lottery laws. The Court stated that there was
no complete immunity from prosecution for gambling under the immunity
statute "in any form," simply by giving testimony concerning gambling.
Immunity was only to be granted from prosecution for offenses "in con-
nection with the specific transactions, matters or things concerning which
the accused actually testified or produced evidence." The Court stated
that this is as far as the immunity need extend to meet constitutional
guarantees. What was necessary was an allegation "as to what the subject
matter of relator's testimony before the grand jury was-other than it
concerned gambling-that the relator is entitled to the presumption that
the information filed against him relates to the 'transaction, matter ot
hearing concerning which' he there gave evidence." Here, on the showing
made, the relator was not entitled to immunization.
In Lorenzo v. Blackburn 9 a county solicitor was conducting an in-
vestigation of gambling and during the investigation sunmmoned the peti-
tioner, who refused to answer questions on the ground of possible incrimina-
tion under the motor vehicle law. The question he refused to answer was
relative to the subject matter of the investigation of the solicitor, and the
immunity statute was held to protect him from prosecution for other
offenses against Florida laws. That law immunizes with reference to "any
investigation . . . for a violation of statutes . . . against . . . gambling
.... "; the Court stated that an investigation by a county solicitor is such
an investigation. Definitely the subject matter of the investigation or trial
must be one of the five statutory categories enumerated, but with this
requirement met, the immunity is to "any transaction . . . concerning
which he may so testify .... " The Court also stated that if the testimony
278. 68 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1953).
279. 74 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1954).
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is "relevant to and has . . . a substantial connection with the subject
of inquiry . . ." the immunity attaches if the testimony is a "link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute such witness thereafter charged
for such offense revealed by testimony he was required to give ..
(111) Self-Incrimination, Generally
In Boynton v. State280 the Court held, as earlier was held in Florida
State Board of Architecture v'. Seymour,2 81 that certain traditional civil
actions will be determined penalties under the operation of the Florida
privilege against self-incrimination. In the Boynton case, the state sued
under proper legislation to enjoin as a nuisance certain property used by
defendant in a lottery operation. An answer was filed in which defendant
declined to respond to the complainant's allegations, including interroga-
tories propounded by the state, all on the grounds that a response would
incriminate the defendant in the state and federal courts. The state argued
that the Florida immunity statute relieved the defendant from any possible
prosecution, and that by response to the allegations, he would receive
immunity; failure to answer was argued as an admission sufficient to support
a decree enjoining the nuisance. The Court held that application of the
nuisance law here would involve a penalty, which is, perhaps, a rather
extreme extension of the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 2  The
Court 283 generally has stated that the privilege was not to protect against
the revealing of facts leading to a civil liability. The Court, however, rarely
seems to decide a case in which a civil liability is defined.28 4
The operaton of the recent federal tax gambling statute and Florida
self-incrimination has been troublesome. In Boynton v. State,285 where
the state, in attempting to enjoin the nuisance, relied on possession of the
federal stamp which indicated gambling at the place sought abated, the
280. 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954); noted in 68 HARv. L. REv. 1074 (1955).
281. 62 So.Zd 1 (Fla. 1952).
282. See general discussion of the privilege, from conservative viewpoint, 8 Wic-
MORE, EVIDENCE, § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
283. See State v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954).
284. E.g., Florida State Board of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.
1952). See also Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 19;5) (very recent case). In
Scheiner, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently held that: (1) for the purpose of
self-incrimination, attorney disbarment will be distinguished from separation from public
employment; (2) the practice of law is no mere "privilege", in the sense that the state
is substantively and/or procedurally unrestrained in disbarment; (3) the ordinary criminal
due process procedures may be required in disbarment; (4) the factual inference leadinz
from a claim of the privilege (the Court did not distinguish between the federal and
state) will not, alone, support disbarment; (5) an attorney, where the issue has to do with
association with the Communist Party, has a duty in the disbarment hearing to satisfy
the trier of fact of his present situation with reference to the Party; (6) the state
must trove more than just a claim of the privilege (probably places the burden of
proof on the Communist issue on the state) against self-incrimination as a basis to
disbar. The Court did not deal with the Florida Bar disciplinary procedures. The
decision is in line with the position of some scholars on the validity of factual inferences
from bare assertion of the privilege, e.g., Griswold, The 5th Amendment Today (1955).
285. 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954). See notes 275, 280 suPra. This was a very
confused decision.
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Court interpreted the federal case, McNabb v. United States,28 in extra-
ordinary fashion, stating that "if payment of the 10 per cent excise
tax for the privilege of gambling is to be treated as a confession, it is
condemned by McNabb." The Court stated that securing a confession
is the same by force as by operation of law. The Court then definitely
foreclosed any attempt to make such a stamp holder, paying the Federal
tax, testify in an admission sense, under the self-incrimination clauses of
either, or both, constitutions. The Court's statement was that both gov-
ernments were in the "gambling business" and that the governments grant
a privilege and take a "cut" and so on. The Court requested "fair play
and sportsmanship" with the gambling profession on the theory that it
would be unfair under the circumstances to take a "cut", use the evidence
required filed, and "entrap and convict" thereon. An interesting attitude
toward self-incrimination, this.
The Court placed the burden on the witness in Lorenzo v. Blackburn28
to "lay a sufficient predicate for his failure to answer the question." Also
it was for the trial court to determine if the particular answer would in-
criminate, and the Supreme Court insisted upon "substantial and imminent
danger" of prosecution.
Earlier in Florida 28 the Court had needlessly combined the privilege
of self-incrimination and the privilege against illegal searches and seizures.
The Court recently 29' may have done the same thing with a statement
(referring to an allegation that a constable had seized defendant's papers)
that a finding "insuring that these private papers contained [no] inculpatory
matter" had not been made.
BoND FINANCING AND THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE IX, SECTION 6
The legal developments in Florida during the last two years in state,
county and municipal bond financing have not been startling. Public works
and improvements are necessities which have to be financed. Without
constitutional restrictions the various creatures of government could, and
probably would, borrow money without reference to the tax structure the
future would bear. The Florida Constitution, Article IX, Section 6, con-
tains the major restrictions on such bond issues:
The Legislature shall have power to provide for issuing State
bonds only for the purpose of repelling invasion or suppressing
insurrection, and the Counties, Districts, or Municipalities of the
State of Florida shall have power to issue bonds only after the
same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in
an election in which a majority of the freeholders who are quali-
fied electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or Municipalities
shall participate . ...
286. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
287. 74 So.2d 289, 291 (Fla. 1954); State v. Kelly, 71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954)
(sam28. State v. Willard, 54 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1951).
289. State v. Pearson, 68 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1953).
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This provision refers only to "bonds," practically insures no state bond
issues and definitely relates the business of paying for public improvements
to the local people who will bear the tax burdens. The legal history of
this constitutional endeavor can be characterized in terms of the devices
the Supreme Court of Florida has fashioned to get around it.DO The
description given the instrument in the particular decision will be followed-
generally "bond" or "certificate."
(1) State Agency Financing
Various state agencies have been permitted by the court to enter bond-
ing arrangements which do not involve general obligations of the state?
1
The recent cases in this area were not unique.
In State v. Florida Turnpike Authorit, -'1'- the argument that the state
would have a moral obligation to discharge the debt of proposed turnpike
bonds failed. The title to, and the body of, the law authorizing the issue
stated the bonds to be solely payable from tolls and that no debt of the state
was incurred; the form of the proposed bonds provided that the state credit
was not pledged. The Court indicated these provisions would preclude
coercive collection from the state and, further, noticed the lenders. -1 3
State v. Florida State Improvement Comniission2- 4 was a suit to validate
revenue bonds to finance Broward county bridge system construction. The
Commission contracted with the State Road Department; under that agree-
ment the Commission was to issue the bonds, take title to the system and
lease it to the Department. Tax funds accruing to the Department for ex-
penditure in the county were pledged to service the bonds, which on their
face so restricted payment. The Department agreed to pay rental, how-
ever, from other sources, for all current operational costs and, if necessary,
monies to complete construction. This arrangement found Court approval
on the issue whether a general pledge of credit had been contracted. This
contract, then, did not demonstrate a pledge of taxing power to service
the bonds.
(II) County and Municipal Financing
In a very real sense, about all one can state that occurred in this
area of constitutional debt was that quite a number of counties and cities
290. Patterson, Legal Aspects of Florida Municipal Bond Financing, 3 FLA. L. RE'.
287 (1953). This article is excellent-it covers the subject in a quite complete setse.
291. Id. at 301-304.
292. 80 So.2d 337, 343 (Fla. 1955).
293. State v. State Bd. of Ed., 67 So.2d 627, (FLA. 1953) was similar. The FLA.
CoNsr. Art. X1I, § 18 provided for creation of fund from motor licensing tax. The
State Board was authorized to issue anticipation certificates. Tihe issuance was validated
since the court found this constitutional provision related the sole way to service the
issue; the state could not be required to pay even if the taxes were insufficient, and
the face of bond defined the sole payment source.
294. 71 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1954). See State v. Florida State Improvement Comm'n.
72 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1954) (the fact the Court determined the taxing power was nut
pledged to service bonds was important).
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validly borrowed money. Some possible decisional distinctions were drawn,
however, in the Supreme Court's ever present efforts to write exceptions into
this constitutional restriction. It is difficult to determine whether the
county-municipal problems, inherent in governmental bonds under Article
IX, Section 6, are distinguishable on any basis founded in reality. Constitu-
tional municipal financing seems to follow the general exceptions laid
down by the Supreme Court for counties.
Certificates payable from improvement revenues.-Orlando v. State2-'
exemplifies this judicial exception to Article IX, Section 6, very well. There
the city, by ordinance, established a special fund and deposited therein all
special assessment tax liens which the city agreed to levy against the private
property benefitted by the proposed improvement. The necessity of free-
holder vote, of course, was the issue. It was held that certificate liquidation
solely from the proceeds "of an independent revenue producing asset" made
the debt not a constitutional "bond". Attorneys drafting certificate forms
should be cognizant that the Court emphasized the safety of a certificate
form relating payment to be solely from the improvement revenue or the
lien, or the same statement in the resolution or law authorizing the issue. '-""
Other decisions were similar to the Orlando case in approach and result.
9'
Certificates payable from other than ad valorern taxation-State v.
Miami 98 is typical of this court constructed exception to Article IX, Sec-
tion 6. The Court validated a city authorized bond issue, serviced solely
from sums payable to the city by the Florida Power and Light Company
franchise. The Court related this sole revenue pledge to the apparent legal
disability of a future taxing power pledge. A similar anticipated cigarette
tax pledge also sailed to safety"'" Notice to lenders through the certificate
face, and so on, here too was emphasized. 00
(III) Miscellany and Conclusion
The state police power to borrow money, with the constitutional in-
hibitions involved, is dealt with in the police power section. However,
there were several miscellaneous decisions in constitutional financing. In
State v. North Bay Village3Ql the issue was whether registration of free-
holders prerequisite to bond election was constitutional in view of Florida
Constitution Article IX, Section 6, and Article Vi, Sections 1 and 2. The
295. 67 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1953); See Hubbard Const. Co. v. Orlando, 67 So.2d 675
(Fla. 1953).
296. See State v l)ade County, 70 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1954) (net revenues of Port
Authority facilities, placed in special fund, to service).
297. State v. Miami, 72 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1954)(warehouse revenue certificates);
State v. Dade County, 70 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1954).
298. 76 So.2d 294, 296 (Fla. 1954).
299. State v. Coral Cables, 72 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1954); State v. Tampa, 72 So.2d
371 (Fla. 1954)(same); accord: Riviere v. Orlando Parking Commission, 74 So.2d 694
(Fla. 1954).
300. See State v. Coral Gables, 72 So.2d 48 (Fia. 1954).
301. 76 So.2d 886, 887 (Fla. 1955).
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Court thoughtfully described the necessary constitutional niceties. The
Florida State Turnpike Authority bonds, to be serviced solely by tolls, were
validated as not pledging the faith and credit of the state under Article IX,
Section 10.302
In conclusion the writer would like to reiterate, in this Survey, that
unless one is particularly interested in governmental financing, this consti-
tional provision, as such, means little. Yet to the initiated there is much
of import here. Prior to the adoption of Article IX, Section 6, it has been
stated that the "only acts necessary for the issuance of ...bonds and the
levy . . . and collection of ad valorem taxes were to have a delegation in
the Legislature from the county who would put through a special act .. .
and then bonds could be issued . . . without any vote of the freeholders
or the people who had to pay the bill." 30 The differing rationale behind
the various twists304 the Supreme Court has taken are simply that "to sug-
gest that the freeholders will not wisely determine the matter is to suggest
the unwisdom of democratic government" 303 as opposed to the attitude
that democracy has been exercised when the local people vote for local
representation. The pressure by the counties and cities to finance needed
long-range improvements-and without "democratic government's" second
chance vote-is presently mirrored in the Florida decisions.
LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
There are several provisions in the Florida Constitution which require
a certain awareness on the part of the legislature in the mundane business
of mechanics of the legislative process 306 or the equally mundane problems
of constitutional drafting.307 The recent cases interpreting these provisions
were not particularly notable.30 8
(1) Article IlI, Section 16
This section states that "Each law enacted in the Legislature shall
embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which
subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended
or revised by reference to its title only . . . ." There were several cases, in
the last two years, interpreting these words.
The Court stated that309 the purpose of this provision "was to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the people and legislature." Apparently the title
302. State v. Florida Turnpike Auth., 80 So.2d 337 (Fla, 1955).
303. State v. Fla. State Improvement Coznm'n, 60 So.2d 747, 750 (Fla. 1952).
304. See note 290 supra.
305. See note 303 supra, at p. 759.
306. E.g., FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 17 (1951)("Every bill shall be read by its
title. ..').307. E.g., FLA. CoNSr. Art. III, § 16 (1951)("Each law ... shall embrace but
one subect . . ."),
130 See, generally, Manson, The Drafting of Statute Titles. 10 .l). L.J. 155
)1934) and Cloe and Marcus, Special and Local Legislation, 24 Kr. L.J. 351 (1936).
ee, also, Comment, The Legislative Subiect Requirement, 9 MIAS [ L.9. 431 (1954).
309. State v. Florida Turnpike Auth., 80 So.2d 337, 342 (Fl. 1955).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
should be "cotuprchensivc" and the acts purpose "plain." The law here
judged was validated since all portions were relevant to the title or "con-
ncctcd with the subject." Held unconstitutional :'1  was a child molester
law, the title to which was insufficient to give notice to the public of
"drastic amendments to the rape statute" in changing the penalty for rape
when the female age was fourteen years or under. Also constitutionally
frowned upon was the failure of the same law to amend as Article III,
Section 16, was held to require. The law embraced eleven different crimes
defined by other laws and (lid not publish at length the statutes, with refer-
ence to rape, which were amended.
3 1
(11) Article Ill, Section 20
This section states that the "Legislature shall not pass special or local
laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, regulating
the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers, or for the punishment of
crime . . . regulating the practice of courts. . . "
A suit3 12 to determine the constitutionality of a civil service law re-
quiring certain procedures in hiring and firing deputy sherffs depended on
whether deputy sheriffs were "officers" in the constitutional sense. Deputy
sheriffs were held a "class of officer." In another caseara a local act, which
prohibited the State Comptroller from withholding from a city the distribu-
tion of cigarette tax money, was held valid on the ground that the law im-
posed duties on the officer merely incidental to the main purpose of the
law. In Lynch v. Durrance14 the Court may" ' have held that portion of
a local law imposing a fine, of not "to exceed $500.00 or imprisonment . . .
not to exceed six months .... " invalid. The law curbed livestock from
roaming at large.
(III) Article III, Section 21316
Slight judicial activity was evident here. In State v. Mellick17 a spe-
cial act called for a referendum on whether it would become operative. The
310. Copeland v. State, 76 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1954).
311. See Justice Mathews. concurring to order, in State v Gray, 74 So.2d 114, 125
(Fla. 1954). The Justice suggested the invalidity of a general appropriation act, the
title to which failed to mention fixing the governor's salary and attempted to amend
without re-enacting and publishing at length.
312. BlaclUlIir v. Brurein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1954).
313. State v. Tampa, 72 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1954).
314. 77 So.2d 458, 459 (F~a. 1955).
315. It is difficult to determine. Perhaps a sinilar case was Taulty v. ilobby,
71 So.2d 489-490 (Fla. 1954)(Court stated the legislature "may by special or local
law declare stated things to be umlawful and provide by valid general law a punishment
for failure to abide thereby.")
316. "In all cases eninerated in the preccding Section, all laws shall be general
but in all cases, not enumnerated . . . the Legislature may pass special or local
law . . . PROVIDED that no local . . bill shall be passed, nor shall any local
or special law establishing or abolishing municipalities, or providing for their government
be passed, unless notice of intention . . . shall have been published.
317. 68 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1954).
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fact that the act election date coincided with the city gencral election date
did not invalidate the act.
Under this provision special or local laws affecting citics may be enacted
when the bill is submitted to qualified electors. In one case 311 the entire
bill was not printed on the ballot, only the purpose was described. It was
stated that: "All that the Constitution requires . .. is that the voter have
notice of that which he must decide. It is a matter of common knowledge
that many weeks are consumed in advance of election, apprising the elec-
torate of the issues . . . and that in this day and agc of radio, television ...
it is idle to argue that every proposition on a ballot must appear at great
... length." The requirement was that the ballot fairly advise the voter
sufficiently to enable an intelligent decision.
(IV) Conclusion"9
The activity of the court under sections 20 and 21 of Article III is im-
portant to the draftor of legislation only as indicative of the attitude of
the court toward those constitutional words. Simply put, if the court is
emphasizing, for example, notice in titles, draftors, to that extent, must be
more careful. It is difficult to cite one case in this constitutional area to
mean much with reference to another case-what is a "reasonable classifica-
tion" or single "subject" changes act by act.
CONCLUSION
320
It is still difficult for this writer to resist the temptation of a few con-
cluding remarks upon the health of Florida constitutional law during the
Survey years.32'
Bluntly, the constitutional legal scene is ailing and a diagnosis defies
simplicity. Since this characterization of the situation would amply describe
much of Florida law, in general, more must be attempted-and it is possible
to localize several causation factors. An incredibly over-worked state su-
preme court explains much of the inadequacy. Maintenance of enlarged
judicial reviewing practices by the Court, when elsewhere such judicial power
318. Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1954).
319. Several miscellaneous provisions in this general constitutional field were
litigated. FLA. CONST. Art. Ill, § 30, restrictive of provision subjects in salary appro-
priation acts of public officers and appropriations for current expenses, was determined
to have a purpose "to prohibit the general appropriation bill for state expenses (from
being) laden with items that tend to hamper the conduct of government;" State v.
Florida Racing Comm'n, 70 So.2d 375, 379 (Fla. 1954). See also Justice Mathews,
concurring to order, in State v. Cray, 74 So.2d 114, 125 (Fla. 1954). Also passed
on were Fr.A. CONST. Art. 11I, § 33, stating that "No statute shall be passed lessening
the time within which a civil action may be commenced on any civil action existing
at the time of its passage," in H.K.L. Realty Corp., 74 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1954)
(stated that law not violative as long as "a reasonable time is provided for the enforcement
of the cause of action before the restriction becomes effective.")
320. This conclusion is that printed two years ago, which attempted a slight
evaluation of that prior Survey period. The story is the same, apparently only the
names of the parties have been changed.
321. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 202 (1954).
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properly dwindles, provides a partial explanation. Perhaps the entirety is
reached by reflection on the antique, poorly drafted, and just as poorly
amended state constitution. Only slight exploration of these is feasible
here. The heavy time burden under which the Court struggles undoubtedly
parallels the analytical nightmare in Florida constitutional law-a nightmare
which only thoughtful aalysis can dissipate. The decisions, at times, have
wrongly decided federal constitutional issues'A22 or so failed to differentiate
between such issues and the state constitutional law that the actual basis
for decision is impossible to dcterminie. .32 3  Statements, unnecessary to de-
cision, imnpregnatc the cases. '4 A Florida judiciary favorite is the shotgun
approach to constitutional law-a number of constitutional grounds being
urged by the court for invalidation purposes. 25  This approach is particu-
larly deadly to the reach of legislative power in the state. Another untidy
practice has been a comingling of statute and constitutional law to the extent
that analysis is impossible. 32  Other decisions have not been specifically
related to a particular clause in the constitution.3 27 The meaning of such
decisions always remains unclear. It might be suggested that the Florida
Supreme Court simply write fewer decisions. This is not a brilliant or
original suggestion, yet under it, quantity, not quality, undoubtedly would
suffer.3 ' . There are other, less obvious, suggestions.
2"1
322. E.g., the Hawkins decision, see Miami Herald, Oct. 20, 1955, P. 1, col. 7,
in which the Florida Court, supposedly moving under the protective coloring of Brown
v. Board of Education, supra, appointed a commission to take testimony to determine
when it will be possible for lawkins, who applied six years ago, to enter the University
of Florida Law School without creating "public mischief." The Brown case under
no hypothesis overruled McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 330 U.S. 637 (1950),
which required immediate unconditioned entrance to the Oklahoma University (graduate)
Law School; see note 245 supra. See Phillips v. West Palm Beach, 70 So.2d 345, 347& Fla. 1954)(soinewhat unsupported federal constitutional statement) and Volusia
ounty Kennel Club v. Haggard, 73 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1954)(very uneasy federal
constitutional interpretation),
323. E.g., Miami Beach v. Silver, 75 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1954); Smithers v. North
St. Lucie River Drainage l)ist., 73 So.2d 235 (Ha. 1954); McVeigh v. State, 73 So.2d
694 (Fla. 1954) (if the Court, in the particular instance desired to parallel federal and
state !aw, it would seem wise to so indicate).
324. Deal v. Nlayo, 76 So.2d 275 (Fla, 1954); e.g., Clearwater v. Caldwell
75 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1954) (constitutional argument unnecessary to decision).
325. E.g., Miami Beach v.'8701 Collins Ave., 77 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1954) (probably
equal protection and substantive due process); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson,
74 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1954) (due process and improper delegation).
326. E.g., Armstrong v. State, 69 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1954). See Lambert v. State,
77 So.2d 869, 871 (Fla. 1955) (the "application of these and other principles P1
we think removes respondent from the class defined .... ")
327. E.g., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 80 So.2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1955) (Court merely
stated "tinder the Constitution .... .") A different example was LaGorce Country
Club v Cerami, 74 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla, 1954)(the denial of "minimum procedural
safeguards" was related to "principles of natural justice.")
328. Why make it easy for those who insist that the present appellate process
is really adequate-no intermediate appellate court system or revision of our present
system sees necessary when the Court quantitatively is up-to-date. See note 7 Supra
for possible intermediate appellate court relief.
329. A great part of the problem is simply adequate analysis, sufficiently translated
to the bar. Compare: Boynton v. State, 75 So.2d 211, 216 (Fla. 1954) ("For these
reasons and others which I have not explored I do not think the state can . ... )
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Judicial self-restraint is difficult to over-emphasize in constitutional law.
Constitutional revolutions have recently taken place which have success-
fully breached an over-powering wall of judicial supremacy.33 0 The hard
won presumptions of legislative corrcctness are of extreme necessity, since
so much of constitutional law is purely a subjective area directly reflecting
the judges' personality and background.33 ' In a modern state the police
power, restricted to health, safety and morals, is a poor thing. The ad-
ministrative process limited by pass6 separation and delegation of power
arguments crumbles before modern problems.33 2  The possibility of yet
other constitutional revolutions-filtering from the federal to the states-
may soon be realized. 333 Contraction of Florida judicial power will
facilitate entrance thereof on the Florida legal stage.
These concerns the Florida Supreme Court rapidly can correct. Fair-
ness compels, however, the admission that an ultimate, other than partial,
solution to Florida constitutional ills undoubtedly necessitates a modern
constitution.334
with the well-reasoned State v. Kelly, 76 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1954) (excepting the concurring
opinion at page 803); Belcher v. Florida Power & Light Co., 74 So2d 56 (Fla. 1954);
Moore v. Lee, 72 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1954). The Court also has a reverence for the
American Jurisprudence work (and like publications) which is unfortunate--these are
not particularly brilliant sources for constitutional law. The Court apparently relied
heavily on such works in many. cases. E.g., Sunny Isles Fishing Pier v. Dade County,
79 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1955); Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State,
75 So.2d 796, 800 (Fla. 1954); Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So.Zd 765, 767 (Fla. 1954);
In re Smith. 74 So.2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1954) (Corpus Juris relied o); Lippow v.
Miami Beach, 68 So.Zd 827, 829 (Fla. 1953). Two Florida law encyclopedias are
newly on the market-reliance un the analysis and policy judgments inherent in such
works would be unjustifiable-in relation to a state supreme court and the state
constitutional law.
330, See, generally, CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).
331. The Florida Court in an admirably frank opinion, Miles Laboratories v.
Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682-683 (Fla. 1954), simply rejected the Florida Legislature's
economic judgment. 'Why not the same open approach in Volusia County Kennel
Club v. Haggard, 73 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1954), in which the invalidation certainly required
the same subjective economic imposition? Any difficult constitutional decision-any
possible ambiguity in constitutional statement-results in real, though often concealed,
judicial legislation; read Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law,
57 YALE L.J. 550 (1948).
332. Unsympathetic judicial treatment wrecks the administrative process. o
course, the lack of a state administrative procedure act helps the judicial hostility to
remain at high tide; absence of traditional judicial procedures, however, may result in
a more expert judgment. See Dession, The Trial of Economics Issues of Fact, 58 YALE
L.J. 1019, 1242 (1949).
333, See CORWIN, TOTAI. WAR AND CONSTITUTION (1st cd. 1947). For example.
the vast constitutionally accommodated legislative-administrative changes of great
economic-social depth, developed in a nation state which majestically maintains political
and civil "rights," are well described i, FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANCE IN
CONrEMPORARY BRITAIN (1951). Increasing economic complexity in our social life
probably will again result in importation of English social-economic legislative experi-
mentation.
334. E.g., the many recent constitutional problems attendant on the untimely
death of Governor McCarty amply prove the point.
